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ENDING THE SUPPRESSION: WHY THE 

HATCH ACT CANNOT WITHSTAND 

MEANINGFUL CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY 

ANTHONY T. KOVALCHICK* 
On March 30, 1981, President Ronald Reagan was wounded in 
an assassination attempt.i Upon hearing this news, a nineteen­
year-old clerical worker in the Office of the Constable of Harris 
County, Texas, allegedly exclaimed to a co-worker, "If they go for 
him again, I hope they get him."2 After a brief conversation with a 
superior, she was discharged for making this statement.3 In Rankin 
v. McPherson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this form of retali­
atory termination by the Office of the Constable in response to po­
litical speech violated the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment, which is applicable to the states by virtue of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Under these cir­
cumstances, the Court determined that a clerical government em­
ployee had a First Amendment right to say, inside of the workplace, 
that she hoped that a future attempt to assassinate the President of 
the United States would be successful.5 Nevertheless, the Court has 
also concluded that, outside of the workplace, such a clerical gov­
ernment employee has no First Amendment right to campaign for 
* Anthony T. KovaIchick received his BS in political science from St. Vincent 
College in 1999 and his JD from Duquesne University School of Law in 2002. He is 
admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Since graduating from law 
school, he has worked as a contract attorney for Choice Counsel, Inc., and Robert Half 
Legal; a law clerk for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania; 
and a volunteer election attorney for Bush/Cheney'04 in Westmoreland County, 
Pennsylvania. 
1. Robert Pear, Jury Indicts Hinckley on 13 Counts Based on Shooting President, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1981, at A, available at 1981 WLNR 170353 (Westlaw). 
2. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987). 
3. Id. at 382. 
4. 1d. at 390-92. 
5. Id. at 390 (noting that she was fired precisely because of the content of her 
speech). 
419 
420 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:419 
or against the President, or any other partisan political candidate.6 
Because of fundamentally misguided legislation and an unprinci­
pled line of judicial decisions, the federal Hatch Act7 has systemati­
cally chilled government employees' participation in partisan 
political activity for over seven decades. Despite some important 
revisions, several provisions of the Hatch Act are clearly contrary 
to basic First Amendment principles. It is incumbent upon legisla­
tors, executives, and jurists alike to end this unconstitutional sup­
pression of partisan political activity. Those who devote their 
careers to public service deserve better than a jurisprudence that 
protects their right to participate in the democratic process as re­
sponsible citizens outside of the workplace to a lesser degree than it 
protects their rights to verbally wish death to the nation's Chief Ex­
ecutive inside of the workplace. 
The Hatch Act, which was named after Senator Carl Hatch of 
New Mexico, was originally enacted in 1939.8 Its purpose was to 
prohibit federal executive employees from voluntarily taking an 
"active part in political management or in political campaigns."9 In 
1940, a similar prohibition was imposed on state and local govern­
ment employees whose duties were connected to federally funded 
programs and activities.10 Despite the severity of the restrictions 
imposed on the expressive activities of government employees by 
the Hatch Act, the Supreme Court upheld the applicable statutory 
prohibitions.ll The Court's decisions upholding the Hatch Act 
have been totally devoid of constitutional analysis. Notwithstand­
ing the First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no 
law ... abridging the freedom of speech," the Court has generally 
deferred to Congress's judgment concerning the alleged need for 
the Hatch Act.12 The Court has done so without making a determi­
6. 5 U.S.c. § 7322 (2000) (defining "partisan political office" as "any office for 
which any candidate is nominated or elected as representing a party any of whose can­
didates for Presidential elector received votes in the last preceding election at which 
Presidential electors were selected, but shaH exclude any office or position within a 
political party or affiliated organization"). See generally U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n V. 
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Pub. Workers V. MitcheH, 
330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
7. Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147. 
8. Id.; Scott J. Bloch, The Judgment of History: Faction, Political Machines, and 
the Hatch Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 225, 231 (2005). 
9. Bloch, supra note 8, at 230-31. 
10. [d. at 233-34; see also Hatch Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767 
(amending the Hatch Act of 1939). 
11. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548; United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. 75. 
12. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564. 
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nation as to whether restrictions on the voluntary participation of 
government employees in partisan political activity are necessary to 
secure the interests asserted by Hatch Act supporters.13 Despite 
the clear implication of First Amendment rights by the Hatch Act, 
the Court has essentially applied a rational basis test in cases in­
volving constitutional challenges to the Act's validity.14 The Su­
preme Court's jurisprudence has resulted in a legacy of suppression. 
History has proven that the interests asserted by Hatch Act 
supporters to justify its prohibitions are not weighty enough to jus­
tify coercing the vast majority of government employees into politi­
cal silence. In 1974, Congress amended the Hatch Act to permit 
covered state and local government employees to participate in par­
tisan political activity.15 Almost two decades later, in 1993, Con­
gress again amended the Hatch Act to permit most federal 
executive employees to "take an active part in political manage­
ment or in political campaigns."16 Nevertheless, in both instances, 
Congress left provisions in place prohibiting covered employees 
from becoming candidates in partisan electionsP Consequently, 
covered employees risk losing their jobs if they run for partisan po­
litical office, even though incumbents in Congress do not have to 
resign in order to run for another position. This attempt by incum­
bents to insulate themselves from electoral challenges from govern­
ment employees has gone virtually unnoticed by many Americans. 
Nevertheless, the time has come for the Hatch Act to be exposed 
for the incumbent-protectionist sham that it is. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the government has 
broader authority to impose restrictions on the speech of its em­
ployees than it does to impose restrictions on the speech of mem­
bers of the general public.18 This basic principle, however, does not 
mean that prohibitions on the partisan political activities of govern­
ment employees are constitutionally permissible. Political cam­
paign speech lies at the very core of the First Amendment, not at its 
13. Rutan v. Republican Party of III., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
14. United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 101 ("For regulation of employees it is not 
necessary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by 
Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service. "). 
15. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 
Stat. 1263; Bauers v. Cornett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1523 (8th Cir. 1989). 
16. 5 U.S.c. § 7323(a) (2000). 
17. Id. §§ 1502(a)(3), 7323(a)(3). 
18. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-74 (1994). 
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outer edges.19 An individual's right to engage in the expressive ac­
tivities associated with a political campaign is highly protected.20 
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently ex­
plained in Republican Party v. White, our constitutional system of 
government was "borne of the great struggle to secure such free­
doms as political speech" and the protection of such freedoms helps 
to "assure the continuance of that constitutional government."21 
Even if one accepts the general proposition that the govern­
ment may restrain the speech of its employees to a greater degree 
than it may restrain the speech of the general public, it does not 
follow that the government may constitutionally prohibit its em­
ployees from engaging in partisan political activity. While "Con­
gress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public 
employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the 
public at large,"22 the Supreme Court has recognized that public 
employees do not relinquish all of their First Amendment rights 
merely because they enter into an employment relationship with 
the government.23 
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the Hatch Act's 
prohibitions on the partisan political activities of government em­
ployees, it has implicitly acknowledged that such prohibitions do 
not serve any weighty governmental interests.24 Instead of giving 
effect to the constitutional mandate of the First Amendment, the 
Court has permitted Congress to silence the political speech of gov­
ernment employees without subjecting the Hatch Act to any mean­
ingful degree of constitutional scrutiny.25 In so doing, the Court has 
abdicated its responsibility to give effect to the Constitution. The 
Hatch Act violates the First Amendment, demeans the dignity of 
the political process, and denigrates the importance of political par­
ticipation. It is fundamentally at odds with basic constitutional 
principles and it cannot withstand the meaningful constitutional 
19. Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir. 2005). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 748. 
22. United States v. Nat'! Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465 
(1995). 
23. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006). 
24. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) ("One could make a respectable 
argument that political activity by government employees is generally not harmful 
...."). 
25. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Nat'! Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 
(1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947). 
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scrutiny that the Supreme Court has inexplicably neglected to apply 
in cases that have challenged its validity. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE 

CONCERNING THE HATCH ACT 

The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer­
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances."26 Although Congress un­
doubtedly has legislative jurisdiction to regulate the terms of fed­
eral employment, that authority is subject to the substantive limits 
imposed by the First Amendment. 
The constitutionality of restrictions on the political activities of 
federal employees has been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
on several occasions. As early as 1882, in Ex parte Curtis, the Court 
upheld a federal statute that made it unlawful for federal executive 
officers and employees, other than those appointed by the Presi­
dent, "to request [from], give to, or receive from any other officer 
or employe of the government any money or property or other 
thing of value for political purposes."27 Violators were not only 
subject to discharge, but were also guilty of a misdemeanor, punish­
able by a five hundred dollar fine.28 In a brief opinion authored by 
Chief Justice Waite, the Court explained that the statutory provi­
sion was a valid attempt by Congress "to promote efficiency and 
integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper 
discipline in the public service."29 The Court observed: 
If contributions from those in public employment may be solic­
ited by others in official authority, it is easy to see that what be­
gins as a request may end as a demand, and that a failure to meet 
the demand may be treated by those having the power of re­
moval as a breach of some supposed duty, growing out of the 
political relations of the parties.3D 
Moreover, it was noted that if it was constitutional for Congress to 
prohibit the underlying activity, "the kind or degree of punishment 
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
27. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 376 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting); id. at 375 
(majority opinion) (holding the statute constitutional). 
28. Id. at 375. 
29. Id. at 373. 
30. Id. at 374. 
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to be inflicted for disregarding the prohibition [was] clearly within 
the discretion of Congress, provided [that it was] not cruel or unu­
sual."31 Since the Constitution gave Congress the authority to cre­
ate the positions held by the employees covered by the statute, the 
prohibition was deemed to be a valid exercise of Congress's author­
ity under the Necessary and Proper Clause.32 
Justice Bradley authored a dissenting opinion in which he ex­
pressed the view that the statutory prohibition violated the First 
Amendment.33 He explained: 
To take an interest in public affairs, and to further and promote 
those principles which are believed to be vital or important to the 
general welfare, is every citizen's duty. It is a just complaint that 
so many good men abstain from taking such an interest. 
Amongst the necessary and proper means for promoting political 
views, or any other views, are association and contribution of 
money for that purpose, both to aid discussion and to dissemi­
nate information and sound doctrine. To deny to a man the privi­
lege of associating and making joint contributions with such 
other citizens as he may choose, is an unjust restraint of his right 
to propagate and promote his views on public affairs. The free­
dom of speech and of the press, and that of assembling together 
to consult upon and discuss matters of public interest, and to join 
in petitioning for a redress of grievances, are expressly secured 
by the Constitution.34 
It is clear from the language of Justice Bradley's dissent that he 
viewed the First Amendment as the embodiment of popular. 
sovereignty. 
The Supreme Court was called upon to decide the constitution­
ality of the Hatch Act in United Public Workers v. Mitchell.35 In 
1947, when United Public Workers was decided, the relevant provi­
sion was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 61h and provided, in pertinent part: 
No officer or employee in the executive branch or the Federal 
Government, or any agency or department thereof, except a part­
time officer or part-time employee without compensation or with 
nominal compensation serving in connection with the existing 
war effort, other than in' any capacity relating to the procurement 
31. [d. 
32. Id. at 372. 
33. [d. at 376-79 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
34. [d. at 376-77. 
35. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
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or manufacture of war material shall take any active part in polit­
ical management or in political campaigns.36 
Those who violated the Act were subject to dismissal from their 
jobs.37 The Court found the Act to be constitutionally permissi­
ble.38 Speaking through Justice Reed, the Court declared that 
"[t]he essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances are 
subject to the elemental need for order without which the guaran­
tees of civil rights to others would be a mockery."39 
The Court's primary basis for upholding the Hatch Act was 
Congress's recognition of a "danger to the service in that political 
rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public 
in that governmental favor may be channeled through political con­
nections. "40 The statutory prohibition was not viewed as a severe 
restraint on the First Amendment rights of federal employees be­
cause it "[left] untouched full participation by employees in politi­
cal decisions at the ballot box and [prohibited] only the partisan 
activity of federal personnel deemed offensive to efficiency."41 The 
Court explained: 
It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted. It is active 
participation in political management and political campaigns. 
Expressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities and 
matters of public interest, not an objective of party action, are 
unrestricted by law so long as the government employee does not 
direct his activities toward party success.42 
The Act's indiscriminate application to employees in various job 
categories was of no concern to the Court. Noting that "Congress 
may have thought that government employees are handy elements 
for leaders in political policy to use in building a political machine," 
the Court declared that "[f]or regulation of employees it is not nec­
essary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasona­
bly deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the 
public service."43 Rejecting the idea that the political activities of 
industrial workers could not be limited even if the political activities 
of administrative workers could be limited, the Court explained 
36. [d. at 78 0.2. 
37. [d. at 79. 
38. [d. at 103. 
39. /d. at 95. 
40. /d. at 98. 
41. [d. at 99. 
42. [d. at 100. 
43. [d. at 101. 
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that" '[ t ]he determination of the extent to which political activities 
of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with 
Congress.'''44 Although it may not have been apparent at the time, 
the Court applied a standard that was no more rigorous than a "ra­
tional basis" review. 
Justice Black dissented on the ground that the Hatch Act vio­
lated the First Amendment.45 He explained that "[p]opular govern­
ment, to be effective, must permit and encourage much wider 
political activity by all the people."46 He declared: 
Our political system, different from many others, rests on 
the foundation of a belief in rule by the people-not some, but 
all the people. Education has been fostered better to fit people 
for self-expression and good citizenship. In a country whose peo­
ple elect their leaders and decide great public issues, the voice of 
none should be suppressed-at least such is the assumption of 
the First Amendment. That Amendment, unless I misunderstand 
its meaning, includes a command that the Government must, in 
order to promote its own interest, leave the people at liberty to 
speak their own thoughts about government, advocate their own 
favored governmental causes, and work for their own political 
candidates and parties.47 
In the opinion of Justice Black, the First Amendment did not allow 
Congress to "make[] honest participation in essential political ac­
tivities an offense punishable by proscription from public 
employment."48 
Justice Douglas also filed a dissenting opinion. He expressed 
the view that if the First Amendment rights of federal employees 
needed to be curtailed for the sake of "the larger requirements of 
modern democratic government," the restrictions imposed by Con­
gress needed to be "narrowly and selectively drawn to define and 
punish the specific conduct which constitut[ ed] a clear and present 
danger to the operations of government."49 According to Justice 
Douglas, the Hatch Act's sweeping prohibitions could not be con­
stitutionally applied to industrial workers.50 He expressed no opin­
44. Id. at 102. 
45. Id. at 109 (Black, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 110. 
47. Id. at 114. 
48. Id. at 115. 
49. Id. at 126 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. 
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ion as to whether prohibitions of this kind could be constitutionally 
applied to employees in other job categories.51 
Subsequent to United Public Workers, the Supreme Court be­
gan to delineate the First Amendment rights of public employees 
with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment. In 
Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court explained that "[t]he 
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether 
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasona­
ble, has been uniformly rejected."52 In Pickering, a high school 
teacher was dismissed for writing a letter to a newspaper that criti­
cized how the Board of Education had allocated financial resources 
between certain academic and athletic programs.53 The Court con­
cluded that the teacher's dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. It was acknowledged that "the State has interests as 
an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ 
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of 
the speech of the citizenry in general. "54 The Court declared that 
"[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of 
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro­
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its 
employees."55 This balancing is frequently referred to as the Pick­
ering balancing test. 
Applying this balancing test, the Court explained that since 
teachers were "the members of a community most likely to have 
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the oper­
ation of the schools should be spent," it was "essential that they be 
able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retalia­
tory dismissal. "56 Although some of the specific financial figures 
included in the teacher's letter were inaccurate, the Court reasoned 
that the school board could have easily rebutted the teacher's errors 
by publishing the actual financial figures in a letter to the same 
newspaperY The precise statements involved, though critical of 
the teacher's employer, were not shown to have impeded the 
51. Id. at 126 n.14. 
52. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967». 
53. Id. at 566. 
54. Id. at 568. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 572. 
57. Id. 
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teacher's proper performance of his duties or to have interfered 
with the general operation of the schools within the districp8 Since 
the fact of the teacher's employment was only "tangentially and in­
substantially involved in the subject matter of the public communi­
cation" contained in the letter, the Court concluded that it was 
"necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general pub­
lic. "59 The Court determined that, absent proof that the teacher's 
statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with 
reckless disregard as to whether they were false, they could not con­
stitutionally furnish the basis for his dismissa1.60 Commenting on 
the importance of the First Amendment issues at stake in the case, 
the Court declared that "[w]hile criminal sanctions and damage 
awards have a somewhat different impact on the exercise of the 
right to freedom of speech [than] dismissal from employment," the 
threat of dismissal was nevertheless "a potent means of inhibiting 
speech."61 
In 1973, five years after Pickering, the Supreme Court revisited 
the issue of the Hatch Act's constitutionality. The applicable provi­
sion of the Hatch Act was 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2), which prohibited 
federal executive employees and employees of the government of 
the District of Columbia from taking "an active part in political 
management or in political campaigns. "62 In United States Civil 
Service Commission v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, the Court 
"unhesitatingly" reaffirmed its prior decision in United Public 
Workers.63 In the Court's view, "neither the First Amendment nor 
any other provision of the Constitution" invalidated a statute bar­
ring federal employees from engaging in partisan political activity.64 
In so holding, the Court referred to "the judgment of history" that 
it was in the best interest of the country "that federal service should 
depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service, 
and that the political influence of federal employees on others and 
on the electoral process should be limited."65 
The opinion of the Court in Letter Carriers was delivered by 
Justice White, who explained that it was the judgment of Congress 
58. Id. at 572-73. 
59. Id. at 574. 
60. Id. 
61. /d. 
62. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n V. Nat') Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 550 
(1973). 
63. /d. at 556. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 557. 
429 2008] ENDING THE SUPPRESSION 
that partisan political activities of federal employees needed to be 
limited if "the Government [was] to operate effectively and fairly, 
elections [were] to play their proper part in representative govern­
ment, and employees themselves [were] to be sufficiently free from 
improper influences. "66 He noted that the Hatch Act's prohibitions 
did not target particular parties or viewpoints, and that they sought 
to control neither the political opinions of federal employees nor 
the votes cast by those employees.67 Relying on the Court's prior 
decision in Pickering, Justice White declared: 
"The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the [government], as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees." Although Congress is free to 
strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the 
balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously impor­
tant interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan 
political activities now contained in the Hatch Act.68 
The Court identified four governmental interests to justify uphold­
ing the Hatch Act. The first was a generalized interest in ensuring 
that federal employees administer the law "in accordance with the 
will of Congress" rather than in accordance with the "will of a par­
ticular political party."69 The Court thought that forbidding parti­
san political activities on the part of federal employees would 
"reduce the hazards to fair and effective government."70 Second, 
the Court believed that it was not only important that federal em­
ployees avoid "practicing political justice," but that "they appear to 
the public to be avoiding it."71 In the Court's view, the Hatch Act 
prevented confidence in the system of representative government 
from being "eroded to a disastrous extent."72 Third, the Court 
noted that Congress had an interest in preventing a political party 
from "using the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal em­
ployees, paid for at public expense, to man its political structure 
and political campaigns. "73 Fourth, the Court highlighted the gov­
66. Id. at 564. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 391 U.S. 562, 568 (1968» (alteration in 
original). 
69. Id. at 564-65. 
70. Id. at 565. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 565-66. 
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ernment's interest in ensuring that federal employees did not feel 
pressured or coerced "to vote in a certain way or perform political 
chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act 
out their own beliefs."74 The Court deferred to the legislative de­
termination that prohibiting federal employees from engaging in 
partisan political activity provided the "most significant safeguard 
against coercion."75 The Court concluded that "[n]either the right 
to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is abso­
lute in any event."76 
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Mar­
shall, Justice Douglas decried the Court's conclusory decision to re­
affirm its prior decision in United Public Workers.77 He insisted 
that if the case had involved "social or economic matters," it would 
have been sufficient for the Court to apply the rational basis stan­
dard that had been the touchstone of the United Public Workers 
precedent.78 Relying on Pickering, Justice Douglas explained that 
United Public Workers had been "of a different vintage" from Let­
ter Carriers.79 He declared that laws trenching on the freedom to 
discuss governmental affairs needed to be "narrowly and precisely 
drawn to deal with precise ends."80 Conceding that the government 
could constitutionally prevent its employees from engaging in parti­
san political activity on office time, Justice Douglas insisted that "it 
[was] of no concern of the government what [the] employee said in 
private to his wife or to the public in Constitution Hall. "81 
Even a cursory reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Let­
ter Carriers reveals its unprincipled nature. As the Court would 
later observe in United States v. National Treasury Employees 
Union, the balancing test that had been applied in Pickering was 
never truly applied in Letter Carriers .82 Instead, the Court simply 
"restated in balancing terms" its prior approval of the Hatch Act in 
United Public Workers.83 In other words, instead of applying Pick­
ering in order to determine whether the Hatch Act was constitu­
74. Id. at 566. 
75. Id. at 566-67. 
76. Id. at 567. 
77. Id. at 596-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 598. 
80. Id. 

8l. /d. at 597. 

82. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 467 
(1995). 
83. Id. 
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tional, the Court simply cited Pickering as a basis for adhering to its 
prior decision in United PubLic Workers. United PubLic Workers 
was decided in accordance with a rational basis analysis.84 Such a 
deferential standard was a far cry from the balancing test that 
would later be applied in Pickering. 
With respect to the first three interests identified by the Court 
to justify its decision to uphold the Hatch Act in Letter Carriers, it is 
clear that the Court blurred the distinction between a federal em­
ployee's job performance and his or her individual speech as a citi­
zen. In Pickering, the Court found it necessary to regard the 
teacher "as the member of the general public" when he spoke out 
against the actions of his employer.85 In Letter Carriers, the Court 
ignored the distinction between an employee's job duties and his or 
her independent speech. Instead of recognizing this distinction and 
applying the Pickering balancing test, the Letter Carriers majority 
simply assumed that federal employees would be unable to perform 
their duties at work in a nonpartisan manner if they were engaging 
in partisan political activities away from the workplace.86 
Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Garcetti v. 
CebaLLos, the First Amendment does not protect a public employee 
from employer discipline for speech made pursuant to that em­
ployee's official duties.87 This is a sensible rule since an employee 
who speaks pursuant to his or her official duties does not speak on 
his or her own behalf as a citizen. Nevertheless, the converse of this 
rule was ignored in Letter Carriers. The Letter Carriers majority 
spoke as if all partisan political activity on the part of a federal em­
ployee was undertaken pursuant to the employee's official duties 
rather than in his or her capacity as a private citizen.88 Where a 
public employee engages in independent speech as a citizen, an in­
quiry must be conducted as to whether this speech is about a matter 
of public concern.89 If the employee's speech does not involve a 
matter of public concern, the public employer's reaction to that 
speech does not violate the First Amendment.90 However, if the 
84. After all, it was in United Public Workers that the Court declared that "[fjor 
regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything more than 
an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public 
service." United Pub. Workers v. MitChell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947). 
85. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). 
86. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65. 
87. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006). 
88. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65. 
89. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568). 
90. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
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employee's speech does involve a matter of public concern, "the 
possibility of a First Amendment claim arises."91 At that point, 
"The question becomes whether the relevant government entity 
had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently 
from any other member of the general public."92 As the Supreme 
Court noted in Garcetti, "So long as employees are speaking as citi­
zens about matters of public concern, they must face only those 
speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate 
efficiently and effectively."93 
The Supreme Court's language in Garcetti defines the constitu­
tionallimit on the government's ability to suppress the speech of its 
employees. This standard does not allow a public employer to have 
the final say as to whether a given restriction on speech is neces­
sary. In Letter Carriers, however, the Court simply deferred to 
Congress's judgment as to the necessity of the Hatch Act.94 The 
rationale that was applied in Letter Carriers acted as a rubber stamp 
for a political judgment that had already been made.95 For this rea­
son, Letter Carriers is at odds with the Court's subsequent decisions 
concerning the First Amendment rights of public employees. 
The fourth interest identified by the Court in Letter Carriers as 
a basis for upholding the Hatch Act was the government's interest 
in protecting its employees from political coercion.96 By relying on 
this interest, however, the Court ignored the fact that the Hatch 
Act was itself coercive. Federal employees were compelled to re­
frain from political activity. Suppressing the political speech of fed­
eral employees for the sake of protecting the First Amendment 
rights of those employees is like banning women from the work­
place in order to prevent sexual harassment. The object of the pro­
hibition is subsumed by the prohibition itself. In Wooley v. 
Maynard, the Court declared that "the right of freedom of thought 
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes 
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking 
at a11."97 The First Amendment protects an affirmative right to 
91. Garcetti, 547 u.s. at 418. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 419. 
94. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 
(1973). 
95. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
96. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 566-67. 
97. Wooley V. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). 
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speak to the same extent that it protects a right to refrain from 
speaking. 
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of 
Duarte, the Supreme Court explained that "the right to engage in 
activities protected by the First Amendment implies 'a correspond­
ing right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of po­
litical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural 
ends.' "98 This right of expressive association "has its fullest and 
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for 
political office."99 As the Court stated in Buckley v. Valeo, "In a 
republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry 
to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential, 
for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the 
course that we follow as a nation."100 Moreover, a citizen's speech 
for or against the election of a political candidate is obviously 
speech regarding a matter of public concern. Consequently, within 
the context of the Pickering balancing test, it would take a very 
weighty governmental interest to outweigh a public employee's in­
terest in participating in a political campaign. 
Had the Court actually applied the Pickering test in Letter Car­
riers, it is highly unlikely that the Hatch Act could have been up­
held on the basis of a generalized interest in "efficiency." For this 
reason, the Court observed, in hindsight, that the "employee-pro­
tective rationale" discussed in Letter Carriers provided a much 
stronger justification for upholding the Hatch Act's prohibition on 
partisan political activity than did the government's interest in 
"workplace efficiency. "101 This rationale, however, accounts only 
for the "protection" of those federal employees who would feel co­
erced or pressured to participate in partisan political campaigns. It 
ignores the First Amendment rights of those employees who would 
choose to participate in partisan political activity rather than be co­
erced into political silence by the Hatch Act. This reality highlights 
the fundamental flaw in the Court's reasoning in United Public 
Workers and Letter Carriers. 
In the aftermath of Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the First Amendment protects government 
98. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'I v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987) 
(quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984». 
99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). 
100. Id. at 14-15. 
101. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 
475-76 n.21 (1995). 
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employees from job-related discrimination on the basis of political 
affiliation. In Elrod v. Burns, the Court held that the First Amend­
ment prohibited public employers from dismissing nonpolicymak­
ing employees because of their political affiliation.lo2 The basis for 
this holding was the severe restrictions on political belief and asso­
ciation that resulted from patronage dismissals.103 This rule was re­
fined in Branti v. Finkel, in which the Court explained that a public 
employer could constitutionally dismiss an employee because of his 
or her political affiliation only upon a showing that party affiliation 
was "an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of 
the public office involved. "104 In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illi­
nois, the Court extended Elrod and Branti by holding that "promo­
tion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level 
government employees may [not] constitutionally be based on party 
affiliation."lo5 Constitutional protection was later extended to in­
dependent contractors in Board of County Commissioners v. 
Umbehr106 and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake.107 
In Umbehr, the Court determined that the First Amendment pro­
tected independent contractors from government entities' retalia­
tory termination of their contracts because of the contractors' 
speech, and that the extent of this protection was to be determined 
in accordance with the Pickering balancing test.108 In O'Hare, the 
Court concluded that it was unconstitutional for a governmental en­
tity to cancel the contract of an independent contractor, or to re­
move that contractor from an official list of contractors authorized 
to perform public services, because of his or her political 
allegiance.109 
The underlying purpose behind the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Elrod, Branti, Rutan, Umbehr, and O'Hare was the protection of 
political freedom. As the Court explained in Rutan, "The First 
Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compel­
ling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its em­
ployees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not 
associate."110 United Public Workers and Letter Carriers are clearly 
102. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
103. Id. 
104. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). 
105. Rutan v. Republican Party of IlL, 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990). 
106. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996). 
107. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996). 
108. Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 673. 
109. O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 714-15. 
110. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76. 
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at odds with this fundamental principle. Participation in a political 
campaign is the quintessential example of the exercise of the "free­
dom to believe and associate" described in Rutan. ll1 The Hatch 
Act's prohibition on partisan political activity, particularly when 
viewed in the context of the Court's rationale for striking down em­
ployment-related patronage policies, is incompatible with the Free 
Speech Clause. 
There is, of course, a distinction between the Hatch Act upheld 
in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers and the patronage 
practices found to be unconstitutional in Elrod, Branti, Rutan, 
Umbehr, and O'Hare. The Hatch Act's prohibitions were view­
point neutral, while the patronage practices were viewpoint based. 
The Hatch Act prohibited federal employees from taking "an active 
part in political management or political campaigns" for the benefit 
of any political party, while the patronage practices rewarded or 
punished employees or contractors for supporting or opposing the 
candidates of a particular party.112 In certain instances, the govern­
ment can impose content-based restrictions on speech that would 
be constitutionally impermissible if they restricted speech on the 
basis of viewpoint. As the Court noted in Davenport v. Washington 
Education Ass'n, "when the government permits speech on govern­
ment property that is a nonpublic forum, it can exclude speakers on 
the basis of their subject matter, so long as the distinctions drawn 
are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served 
by the forum."113 The most rigorous form of First Amendment 
scrutiny is applicable when public officials attempt to suppress ex­
pression merely because they disagree with the speaker's views.l14 
In any event, the tension between the decisions upholding the 
Hatch Act and the decisions invalidating patronage policies is not 
eliminated merely because the Hatch Act was only content-based 
while the patronage policies were viewpoint based. The Court in­
validated the patronage policies for the purpose of safeguarding the 
political freedom of public employees and contractors.l15 Never­
theless, a First Amendment right to be free from viewpoint-based 
retaliation for engaging in political activity is of little constitutional 
value if the government can prohibit that same activity by enacting 
a content-based prohibition like the Hatch Act. Content-based 
111. Id. 
112. 5 U.S.C. § 7323 (2000). 
113. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007). 
114. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998). 
115. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 725-26 (1996). 
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prohibitions on collective political expression prohibit the same ac­
tivities that are chilled by unconstitutional patronage practices. To 
the extent that the Hatch Act was designed to protect the First 
Amendment rights of federal employees, it was inherently self-de­
feating. The Free Speech Clause protects both the "freedom to be­
lieve and associate" and the freedom "to not believe and not 
associate."116 Prohibitions on political activity sacrifice the former 
for the sake of the latter. Moreover, when political activity is pro­
hibited, employees are not freely exercising their right to refrain 
from political activity. Instead, they are coerced into refraining 
from political activity. Given this reality, the underlying rationale 
for the Court's decisions in United Public Workers and Letter Carri­
ers was nonsensical. 
In Branti, the Supreme Court explained that the government 
demonstrates a compelling interest in making personnel decisions 
on the basis of political affiliation only when it can show that "party 
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective perform­
ance of the public office involved."117 The line between positions 
for which party affiliation is an appropriate requirement and posi­
tions for which it is not can be difficult to draw. This difficulty, 
however, is not obviated by content-based prohibitions on public 
employees' participation in partisan political activity. When politi­
cal affiliation is an appropriate requirement for a given position, the 
government is free to engage in viewpoint-based discrimination 
when it fills that position.118 This is true even if the employee who 
accepts the position is thereafter prohibited from engaging in politi­
cal activity.119 For this reason, the fact that the First Amendment 
permits the government to make viewpoint-based personnel deci­
sions in limited circumstances provides no constitutional justifica­
tion for content-based prohibitions like the Hatch Act. 
The Hatch Act cannot be justified on the basis of Congress's 
clear legislative jurisdiction to regulate the terms of federal employ­
ment. Although the Constitution undoubtedly bestows on Con­
gress the authority to set the terms and conditions of federal 
employment,12o the First Amendment imposes a substantive limit 
116. Rutan v. Republican Party of IIl., 497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990). 
117. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). 
118. See id. 
119. [d. 
120. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 3. 
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on that authority.121 If legislation could be sustained in the face of 
a First Amendment challenge solely on the basis of Congress's leg­
islative jurisdiction, the First Amendment would itself be wholly su­
perfluous. If Congress has no express or implied constitutional 
authority to enact a law in the first place, the law is unconstitutional 
regardless of whether it abridges the freedom of speech.122 Even 
when Congress acts within its constitutional sphere of authority, 
legislation that does not comport with the First Amendment is 
void.123 
In certain instances, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
particular Article I powers are inherently suited to accommodate 
First Amendment concerns. For example, the Copyright and Patent 
Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci­
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis­
coveries."124 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court explained that the 
"limited monopolies" created by copyright law are "compatible 
with free speech principles."125 "By establishing a marketable right 
to the use of one's expression, copyright [law] supplies the eco­
nomic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."126 As the Court 
noted in Eldred, copyright law "distinguishes between ideas and ex­
pression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protec­
tion."127 When a constitutional or statutory provision is precisely 
tailored to accommodate First Amendment concerns, the need for 
strict judicial scrutiny is less apparent.128 In contrast, when statu­
tory provisions specifically target expressive activities for suppres­
sion, the need for exacting judicial scrutiny is more obvious. The 
collective action that occurs when citizens band together to elect a 
political candidate is, of course, at the very heart of the First 
121. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 
465-68 (1995). 
122. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
123. Ashcroft v. Free Speech CoaL, 535 U.S. 234, 253-55 (2002). 
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
125. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
126. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 
(1985)). 
127. Id.; see 17 U.S.c. § 102(b) (2000). 
128. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535 
(1987). 
438 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:419 
Amendment.129 It is clear that the Hatch Act contains no "built-in 
First Amendment accommodations. "130 
In addition to statutes that contain built-in accommodations 
for First Amendment freedoms, there are statutory provisions that 
burden or prohibit only those forms of speech that are categorically 
unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. A classic example of this 
type of legislation is the Trademark Act of 1946, which is commonly 
referred to as the Lanham Act.l3l The Lanham Act contains both 
provisions prohibiting trademark infringement and provisions 
prohibiting false or misleading advertising.132 The Lanham Act's 
trademark infringement provisions prohibit the commercial use of 
registered marks when "such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive."133 The statute's unfair competition 
provisions prohibit the commercial use of "false designation[ s] of 
origin, false or misleading description [ s] of fact, or false or mislead­
ing representation[ s] of fact. "134 Civil liability is imposed on those 
who violate the Lanham Act.135 This statute, however, does not 
raise First Amendment concerns because it deals with false or mis­
leading commercial speech, which is categorically unprotected by 
the First Amendment.136 For this reason, Congress can use its au­
thority under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation such as the 
Lanham Act. Unlike false or misleading commercial speech, politi­
cal campaign speech is highly protected.137 Consequently, statutory 
prohibitions on partisan political activity do not fall within the con­
stitutional authority of Congress even when Congress acts pursuant 
to an express or implied constitutional power. 
129. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). 
130. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (noting that since copyright law contains built-in 
First Amendment protections, the Copyright Term Extension Act did not violate the 
First Amendment). 
131. ColI. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666, 669 (1999). 
132. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1114, 1125 (2000). 
133. Id. § 1114(1)(a)-(b). 
134. Id. § 1125(a). 
135. !d. §§ 1114, 1125. 
136. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 
(1999) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & EJec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557 (1980». 
137. Republican Party V. White, 416 F.3d 738, 748-49 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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II. THE HATCH ACT'S CURRENT ApPLICATION 
TO FEDERAL EXECUTIVE EMPLOYEES 
In 1993, Congress amended the Hatch Act to permit most ex­
ecutive branch employees to participate in partisan political activ­
ity.Bs The amended statute declares it to be "the policy of the 
Congress that employees should be encouraged to exercise fully, 
freely, and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and to the extent not 
expressly prohibited by law, their right to participate or to refrain 
from participating in the political processes of the Nation."139 For 
purposes of the Act, the term "employee" includes: 
any individual, other than the President and the Vice President, 
employed or holding office in ... an Executive agency other than 
the Government Accountability Office ... a position within the 
competitive service which is not an Executive agency, ... or ... 
the government of the District of Columbia, other than the 
Mayor or a member of the City Councilor the Recorder of 
Deeds; but does not include a member of the uniformed 
services.140 
The Act's substantive provisions are codified at 5 U.S.c. 
§§ 7323 and 7324. Section 7323(a)(1) prohibits an employee from 
"us[ing] his [or her] official authority or influence for the purpose 
of interfering with or affecting the result of an election."141 Section 
7323(a)(2) limits the category of persons from whom an employee 
may "solicit, accept or receive a political contribution."142 Most no­
tably, § 7323(a)(2)(B) prohibits employees from seeking political 
contributions from their subordinates.143 Under § 7323(a)(3), an 
employee may not "run for the nomination or as a candidate for 
election to a partisan political office."144 The term "partisan politi­
cal office" is defined as "any office for which any candidate is nomi­
nated or elected as representing a party any of whose candidates for 
Presidential elector received votes in the last preceding election at 
which Presidential electors were selected, [excluding] any office or 
position within a political party or affiliated organization. "145 Sec­
tion 7323(a)(4) provides that an employe~ may not "knowingly so­
138. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001. 
139. 5 U.S.c. § 7321 (2000). 
140. Id. § 7322(1)(A)-(C). 
141. Id. § 7323(a)(I). 
142. [d. § 7323(a)(2). 
143. Id. § 7323(a)(2)(B). 
144. Id. § 7323(a)(3). 
145. Id. § 7322(2). 
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licit or discourage the participation in any political activity of any 
person who . . . has an application for any compensation, grant, 
contract, ruling, license, permit, or certificate pending before the 
employing office of such employee," or who "is the subject of or a 
participant in an ongoing audit, investigation, or enforcement ac­
tion being carried out by the employing office of such em­
ployee."146 Section 7324(a) generally prohibits employees, who are 
on duty, from engaging in political activity while 
in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official du­
ties by an individual employed or holding office in the Govern­
ment of the United States or any agency or instrumentality 
thereof, ... while wearing a uniform or official insignia identify­
ing the office or position of the employee, ... or while using any 
vehicle owned or leased by the Government of the United States 
or any agency or instrumentality thereof.147 
Some employees are subject to more restrictive provisions. 
Section 7323(b)(1) provides that "[a]n employee of the Federal 
Election Commission (except one appointed by the President, by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate), may not request or 
receive from, or give to, an employee, a Member of Congress, or an 
officer of a uniformed service a political contribution."148 Employ­
ees of agencies and offices enumerated in § 7323(b )(2)(B), except 
those employees "appointed by the President, by and with the ad­
vice and consent of the Senate," are prohibited from taking an "ac­
tive part in political management or political campaigns."149 The 
agencies and offices covered under this prohibition include the Fed­
eral Election Commission or Election Assistance Commission; Fed­
eral Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service; Central Intelligence 
Agency; National Security Council; National Security Agency; De­
fense Intelligence Agency; Merit Systems Protection Board; Office 
of Special Counsel; Office of Criminal Investigation of the Internal 
Revenue Service; Office of Investigative Programs of the U.S. Cus­
toms Service; Office of Law Enforcement of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
146. Id. § 7323(a)(4)(A)-(B). 
147. Id. § 7324(a)(1)-(4). These prohibitions are qualified by § 7324(b). 
148. Id. § 7323(b)(1). 
149. Id. § 7323(b)(2)(A). Section 7323(b)(4) provides: 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "active part in political management 
or in a political campaign" means those acts of political management or politi­
cal campaigning which were prohibited for employees of the competitive ser­
vice before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission 
under the rules prescribed by the President. 
[d. 
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Tobacco, and Firearms; National Imagery and Mapping Agency 
(National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency); and Office of the Direc­
tor of National Intelligence.15o The prohibition also applies to ad­
ministrative law judges and administrative appeals judges who are 
employed in positions described in 5 V.S.c. §§ 5372, 5372a, and 
5372b, as well as "career appointees"151 described in 5 V.S.c. 
§ 3132(a)(4).152 Section 7323(b)(3) provides that "[n]o employee of 
the Criminal Division or National Security Division of the Depart­
ment of Justice (except one appointed by the President, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate), may take an active part in 
political management or political campaigns."153 The Act makes it 
clear, however, that "[a]n employee retains the right to vote as he 
[or she] chooses and to express his [ or her] opinion on political sub­
jects and candidates."154 
The penalties for violating the Act are described in § 7326, 
which provides: 
An employee or individual who violates section 7323 or 7324 of 
this title [5 U.S.C.] shall be removed from his position, and funds 
appropriated for the position from which removed thereafter 
may not be used to pay the employee or individual. However, if 
the Merit System Protection Board finds by unanimous vote that 
the violation does not warrant removal, a penalty of not less than 
30 days' suspension without pay shall be imposed by direction of 
the Board. I55 
Given the language of the statute, covered employees who engage 
in prohibited political activities risk losing their jobs. 
In many ways, the importance of the alleged interests relied 
upon by the Supreme Court to uphold the Hatch Act in United 
Public Workers and Letter Carriers is belied by Congress's subse­
quent decision to permit most federal employees to actively partici­
pate in partisan political activities. Although § 7323(b) still 
prohibits some employees from taking "an active part in political 
management or political campaigns," the overwhelming majority of 
150. Id. § 7323(b)(2)(B)(i). 
151. Id. § 3132(a)(4) (defining a "career appointee" as "an individual in a Senior 
Executive Service position whose appointment to the position or previous appointment 
to another Senior Executive Service position was based on approval by the Office of 
Personnel Management of the executive qualifications of such individual"). 
152. /d. § 7323(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
153. Id. § 7323(b)(3). 
154. Id. § 7323(c). 
155. Id. § 7326. 
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federal employees are now free to engage in political activities away 
from the workplace.156 The fact that § 7323(a) has permitted active 
political participation by most federal employees since 1993 without 
wreaking the havoc predicted by Hatch Act supporters serves to 
illustrate the speculative exaggerations behind the rationale 
adopted by the Court in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers. 
Shortly after Congress relaxed the Hatch Act's restrictions on 
most federal employees, the Supreme Court commented on the 
government's authority to restrain the speech of its employees in 
Waters v. Churchill.157 In a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg, Justice O'Connor 
declared that "[t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as 
effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively 
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one 
when it acts as employer."158 In dictum, Justice O'Connor ex­
plained that while "[o]ne could make a respectable argument that 
political activity by government employees is generally not harm­
ful," the Court had "given substantial weight to government em­
ployers' reasonable predictions of disruption."159 The problem with 
this reasoning is that it ignores the nature of the constitutional in­
quiry. The constitutionality of a prohibition on political activity de­
pends precisely on whether it is necessary.160 If that were not the 
case, there would be no meaning to the Court's admonition in 
Garcetti that "[s]o long as employees are speaking as citizens about 
matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restric­
tions that are necessary for their employer to operate efficiently and 
effectively."161 As Justice Scalia noted in his Rutan dissent, the 
Court did not conclude that the Hatch Act was necessary in United 
Public Workers or Letter Carriers .162 Instead, the Court simply de­
ferred to Congress's judgment without subjecting the Hatch Act to 
any measure of meaningful judicial scrutiny.163 
A little over a year after the 1993 amendments to the Hatch 
Act, the Supreme Court decided United States v. National Treasury 
156. 5 V.S.c. § 7323(a). 
157. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
158. Id. at 675. 
159. Id. at 673. 
160. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (stating that "[w]hen a citizen 
enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his 
or her freedom." (emphasis added)). 
161. Id. (emphasis added). 
162. Rutan v. Republican Party of III., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
163. /d. 
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Employees Union (NTEU).164 In NTEU, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of 5 U.S.c. § 50l(b), the Ethics in Government 
Act, "which broadly prohibited federal employees from accepting 
compensation for making speeches or writing articles. "165 Speaking 
through Justice Stevens, the Court explained that the federal em­
ployees who challenged § 501(b) sought "compensation for their 
expressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as government 
employees."166 "Unlike Pickering and its progeny," Justice Stevens 
noted, NTEU "did not involve a post hoc analysis of one em­
ployee's speech and its impact on that employee's public responsi­
bilities."167 Instead, the government asked the Court "to apply 
Pickering to Congress' wholesale deterrent to a broad category of 
expression by a massive number of potential speakers."168 
The Court stated that while it "normally accord[ ed] a stronger 
presumption of validity to a congressional judgment than to an indi­
vidual executive's disciplinary action," the far-reaching impact of 
§ 50l(b)'s honoraria ban "gave rise to far more serious concerns 
than could any single supervisory decision."169 Moreover, it was 
noted that "unlike an adverse action taken in response to actual 
speech," § 50l(b) chilled speech before it happened.170 The Court 
went on to state: 
[T]he Government's burden is greater with respect to this statu­
tory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated dis­
ciplinary decision. The Government must show that the interests 
of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and fu­
ture employees in a broad range of present and future expression 
are outweighed by the expression's "necessary impact on the ac­
tual operation" of the Government.l71 
Even though § 501(b) neither prohibited speech nor discriminated 
among speakers "based on the content or viewpoint of their 
messages," the Court recognized that § 501(b) "unquestionably im­
pose[d] a significant burden on expressive activity" by denying fed­
eral employees a significant incentive to engage in such activity.In 
164. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454 
(1995). 
165. Id. at 457. 
166. Id. at 465. 
167. [d. at 466-67. 
168. [d. at 467. 
169. Id. at 468. 
170. Id. 
171. [d. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)). 
172. [d. at 468-69. 
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This "large-scale disincentive to Government employees' expres­
sion also impose[ d] a significant burden on the public's right to read 
and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and 
said."173 Ultimately, the Court concluded that § 501(b) violated the 
First Amendment.174 The Court reasoned that: 
Because the vast majority of the speech at issue ... [did] not 
involve the subject matter of Government employment and 
[took] place outside of the workplace, the Government [was] un­
able to justify § 501(b) on the grounds of immediate workplace 
disruption asserted in Pickering and the cases that followed itP5 
Although the government relied on United Public Workers and 
Letter Carriers for the proposition that the compensation prohib­
ited by § 50l(b) could be proscribed merely because it was "'rea­
sonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the 
public service,' "176 the Court distinguished the Hatch Act on the 
ground that it had "aimed to protect employees' rights, notably 
their right to free expression, rather than to restrict those rights."177 
In a footnote, the Court stated that the Hatch Act's "employee­
protective rationale provided much stronger justification for a pro­
scriptive rule than the Government's general interest in workplace 
efficiency."178 Notably, this observation was made after Congress 
had already repealed the Hatch Act's ban on partisan political ac­
tivity with respect to the overwhelming majority of federal employ­
ees.179 In addition, the Court acknowledged that Letter Carriers 
had merely "restated in balancing terms" the Court's prior approval 
of the Hatch Act in United Public Workers, and that the majority 
opinion in Letter Carriers "did not determine how the components 
of the Pickering balance should be analyzed in the context of a 
sweeping statutory impediment to speech."180 
The rationale employed by the Court in NTEU illustrates two 
important points. First, despite the reference to Pickering in Letter 
Carriers, the Court never actually applied the Pickering balancing 
test to the Hatch Act.181 Second, NTEU acknowledges that the 
173. !d. at 470. 
174. Id. at 470, 477. 
175. Id. at 470. 
176. Id. (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947». 
177. Id. at 471. 
178. Id. at 475-76 n.21. 
179. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001. 
180. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467. 
181. See id. 
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government's burden is greater when it imposes a sweeping statu­
tory restriction on expression than it is when the government 
merely defends a particular disciplinary decision.182 Like § 501(b), 
the Hatch Act cannot be sustained under Pickering unless the gov­
ernment can "show that the interests of both potential audiences 
and a vast group of present and future employees" in hearing or 
that expressing political messages "are outweighed by that expres­
sion's 'necessary impact on the actual operation of the Govern­
ment.' "183 This is a much higher standard than the rational basis 
standard applied in United Public Workers. The Court's past analy­
sis of the Hatch Act under a rational basis standard cannot be rec­
onciled with its present-day First Amendment jurisprudence. 
Pickering is an imprecise standard, and its exact contours re­
main uncertain. The Court recently extended the Pickering balanc­
ing test, which had previously been applied only in the context of 
speech by public employees and independent contractors, to a situ­
ation in which a high school athletic association promulgated a rule 
prohibiting high school coaches from recruiting middle school ath­
letes. l84 In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brent­
wood Academy, the Court explained that "[j]ust as the 
government's interest in running an effective workplace can in 
some circumstances outweigh employee speech rights, so too can an 
athletic league's interest in enforcing its rules sometimes warrant 
curtailing the speech of its voluntary participants."185 The Court 
determined that the association's interest in preventing "hard-sell 
tactics directed at middle school students" outweighed the expres­
sive interests of coaches who wanted to engage in prohibited 
recruiting practices.186 
While Brentwood Academy emphasized the government's in­
terest in suppressing a category of speech directed at a narrow 
group of individuals, it is clear that political campaign speech is 
closer to the core of the Free Speech Clause than is speech designed 
to recruit high school athletes. In various instances, the expressive 
activities commonly associated with political campaign speech have 
182. Id. at 468. 
183. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 
(1968)). 
184. Tenn. Secondary Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2492, 
2495-98 (2007). 
185. /d. at 2495 (citation omitted). 
186. Id. at 2495-96. 
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been characterized as "highly-protected" speech.187 The Court's 
failure to engage in a meaningful analysis of the Hatch Act's consti­
tutionality in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers was 
demeaning to the importance of political association in the United 
States. Of course, it is true that a public employee is not always 
entitled to Pickering balancing when he or she is disciplined in re­
taliation for speech. For instance, in City of San Diego v. Roe, the 
Court held that there was no need for Pickering balancing where a 
police officer was terminated for making sexually explicit video­
tapes of himself in his police uniform.188 Since the officer's 
"speech" did not touch on a matter of public concern, his termina­
tion was deemed to be constitutionally permissible without the 
need for the Pickering balancing test.189 Political campaign speech, 
however, is the most obvious example of speech addressing a mat­
ter of public concern. By applying a rational basis test rather than a 
balancing test in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers, the 
Court treated political campaign speech as if it were akin to the 
sexually explicit videotapes at issue in Roe. The rationale adopted 
in NTEU makes it clear that the Hatch Act is unconstitutional 
under the Pickering balancing test.190 United Public Workers and 
Letter Carriers stand in stark contrast to the Court's subsequent de­
cisions applying Pickering, and cannot be reaffirmed if the Court is 
serious when it says that "[t]he First Amendment limits the ability 
of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to 
restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy 
in their capacities as private citizens."191 
III. THE HATCH ACT'S PROHIBITION ON 

PARTISAN POLITICAL CANDIDACIES 

In the wake of the 1993 amendments to the Hatch Act, most 
federal employees are now free to actively engage in partisan politi­
cal activity.192 Nevertheless, § 7323(a)(3) still prohibits covered 
employees from "run[ ning] for the nomination or as a candidate for 
187. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 748-49 (8th Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006). 
188. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004). 
189. [d. at 80-85. 
190. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 
454,470-77 (1995). 
191. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
192. 5 U.S.c. § 7323(a) (2000). 
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election to a partisan political office."193 In NTEU, the Supreme 
Court opined that the Hatch Act's "employee-protective rationale" 
had provided a "much stronger justification for a proscriptive rule" 
than had the government's generalized interest in "workplace effi­
ciency."194 While prohibiting federal employees from participating 
in another candidate's campaign may at least be rationally related to 
a governmental interest in preventing coercion, a prohibition on 
candidacy is not even remotely related to this purported interest. It 
would certainly be ludicrous for one to contend that a federal em­
ployee running for public office might feel pressured or coerced to 
participate in his or her own campaign. Despite this reality, federal 
employees covered by the Hatch Act risk losing their jobs if they 
choose to run for a partisan political office. This is due, in large 
part, to the fact that the Hatch Act has been completely divorced 
from the original purpose of its enactment. 
It is clear that federal employees cannot be disqualified from 
eligibility to serve in Congress. The Qualifications Clause of Arti­
cle I, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides: "No Person shall 
be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of 
twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United 
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that 
State in which he shall be chosen."195 Similarly, the Qualifications 
Clause of Article I, Section 3, provides: "No Person shall be a Sen­
ator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and 
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, 
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be 
chosen."196 The qualifications contained in these two provisions are 
exclusive, and Congress has no authority to add to them.197 In 
Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court held that Article I, Sec­
tion 5 does not give the House of Representatives or the Senate the 
"authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents, 
who meets all the requirements for membership expressly pre­
scribed in the Constitution."198 The Constitution does, of course, 
give each house the authority to "punish its Members for disorderly 
193. Id. § 7323(a)(3). 
194. NTEU, 513 u.S. at 475-76 n.21. 
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
196. Id. art. I, § 3. 
197. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (hold­
ing that an amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution that imposed term limits on 
otherwise eligible congressional candidates to be unconstitutional). 
198. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969). 
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Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, [to] expel a 
Member."199 Nevertheless, an individual elected to a seat in the 
House of Representatives or the Senate cannot be excluded unless 
the respective chamber determines that he or she does not meet the 
exclusive qualifications enumerated in Article I. Consequently, 
Congress has no power to keep a federal employee off of the ballot 
in a congressional election. 
The Supreme Court elaborated on this principle further in 
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.2°o In United States 
Term Limits, the Court invalidated an amendment to the Arkansas 
Constitution, which prohibited the name of a congressional candi­
date from appearing on the general election ballot if he or she had 
already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two 
terms in the Senate.201 The amendment, which was known as 
Amendment 73, was found to violate the U.S. Constitution.202 
The Court's analysis in United States Term Limits relied signifi­
cantly on Powell. Justice Stevens, who authored the United States 
Terms Limits opinion, explained that Powell had established two 
important principles of constitutionallaw.203 The first principle was 
that the Framers intended the qualifications enumerated in Article 
I to be exclusive.204 The second principle was "that the people 
should choose whom they please to govern them."205 The right of 
the people to elect members of the House of Representatives ex­
isted from the inception of the Constitution.206 Members of the 
Senate were originally chosen by their respective state legislatures, 
but the Seventeenth Amendment provided for the popular election 
of Senators.207 Given the language contained in Article I and the 
Seventeenth Amendment, it is the prerogative of the people to 
elect any candidate who meets the exclusive qualifications for a seat 
in Congress. 
The Court found Amendment 73 to be unconstitutional be­
cause it prevented candidates who met the qualifications enumer­
ated in Article I from appearing on a congressional election 
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, 
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members."). 
200. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779. 
201. Id. at 783. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 795. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969». 
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amend XVII. 
207. Id. art. I, § 3, amend. XVII. 
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ballot.20S The Court rejected the argument that Amendment 73 
was a valid exercise of Arkansas's powers under the Elections 
Clause.209 The Elections Clause provides: "The Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall 
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con­
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, ex­
cept as to the Places of chusing Senators."210 Arkansas argued that 
Amendment 73 was a valid exercise of its Elections Clause author­
ity, since candidates who could not obtain access to the ballot could 
nevertheless run as write-in candidates.211 The Court rejected this 
argument on the ground that the Elections Clause was intended "to 
grant States authority to create procedural regulations, not to pro­
vide States with license to exclude classes of candidates from fed­
eral office."212 Amendment 73 was invalidated as "an indirect 
attempt to accomplish what the Constitution prohibit[ed] Arkansas 
from accomplishing directly. "213 
The Supreme Court discussed this point further in Cook v. 
Gralike.214 Cook involved a challenge to an amendment to article 
VIII of the Missouri Constitution that was designed to encourage 
members of Missouri's congressional delegation to support a fed­
eral constitutional amendment to limit service in Congress to three 
terms in the House of Representatives and two terms in the Sen­
ate.2IS The Court explained how article VIII, as amended, pur­
ported to achieve its objective: 
Three provisions in Article VIII combine to advance its purpose. 
Section 17 prescribes that the statement "DISREGARDED 
VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" be printed on 
all primary and general [election] ballots adjacent to the name of 
a Senator or Representative who fails to take anyone of eight 
legislative acts in support of the proposed amendment. Section 
18 provides that the statement "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO 
SUPPORT TERM LIMITS" be printed on all primary and gen­
eral election ballots next to the name of every nonincumbent 
congressional candidate who refuses to take a "Term Limit" 
pledge that commits the candidate, if elected, to performing the 
208. u.s. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 828-38. 
209. Id. 
210. U.S. CONST. art. J, § 4. 
211. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 828-38. 
212. Id. at 832-33. 
213. Id. at 829. 
214. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). 
215. Id. at 514. 
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legislative acts enumerated in § 17. And § 19 directs the Mis­
souri Secretary of State to determine and declare, pursuant to 
§§ 17 and 18, whether either statement should be printed along­
side the name of each candidate for Congress.216 
Don Gralike, a nonincumbent congressional candidate, challenged 
the constitutionality of article VIII, sections 17 to 19.217 The Mis­
souri Secretary of State contended that article VIII, as amended, 
was a valid exercise of Missouri's powers under the Elections 
Clause and the Tenth Amendment.218 The Court determined that 
neither the Elections Clause nor the Tenth Amendment provided 
Missouri with the constitutional authority to enact sections 17 to 19 
of article VIIJ.219 
Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion of the Court in u.s. 
Term Limits, also delivered the opinion of the Court in Cook. Re­
jecting the argument that the amendment to article VIII constituted 
an exercise of Tenth Amendment power, he explained that the fed­
eral offices at stake arose from the Constitution itself.220 Justice 
Stevens declared that "[b]ecause any state authority to regulate 
election to those offices could not precede their very creation by 
the Constitution, such power 'had to be delegated to, rather than 
reserved by, the States."'221 Noting that the Elections Clause "del­
egated to the States the power to regulate the 'Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,' 
subject to a grant of authority to Congress to 'make or alter such 
Regulations,''' he stated that "[n]o other constitutional provision 
gives the States authority over congressional elections, and no such 
authority could be reserved under the Tenth Amendment."222 Con­
sequently, "the States may regulate the incidents of such elections, 
including balloting, only within the exclusive delegation of power 
under the Elections Clause."223 Since the amended version of arti­
cle VIII was not a procedural regulation, but rather an attempt" 'to 
216. Id. 514-15 (citations omitted). 
217. Id. at 516. 
218. Id. at 518. 
219. Id. at 522-23. 
220. Id. at 522 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 
(1995)). 
221. Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 804). 
222. Id. at 522-23 (citations omitted). 
223. Id. at 523. 
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favor or disfavor a class of candidates,' "224 it was not deemed to be 
a valid exercise of Missouri's Elections Clause authority.225 
Powell, U.S. Term Limits, and Cook all stand for the proposi­
tion that the right to choose elected representatives in Congress lies 
not with Congress or the states, but with the people. Section 
7323(a)(3) does not prevent a federal employee from securing a 
place on a primary or general election ballot.226 Instead, it ensures 
that a covered employee who exercises his or her right to run for a 
partisan political office will face dismissal from federal employ­
ment.227 Since the Hatch Act neither denies federal employees ac­
cess to the ballot nor imposes an additional qualification on those 
employees who seek election to Congress, it does not violate the 
Qualifications Clauses. Nevertheless, it virtually ensures that a cov­
ered employee will be terminated in retaliation for becoming a con­
gressional candidate. Such termination is based not on workplace 
disruptions or adverse effects on the government's operations, but 
solely because a federal employee chooses to run for a partisan po­
litical office. Moreover, since most federal employees are now free 
to participate in partisan political activity under § 7323(a), the "em­
ployee-protective rationale" referenced in NTEU can no longer 
serve as a "justification for a proscriptive rule. "228 The inevitable 
conclusion is that § 7323(a)(3) violates the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment protects not only the right to participate 
in political campaigns, but also the right to pursue political office as 
a candidate. The rights of candidates are inextricably linked with 
the rights of voters.229 The Court's "ballot access cases" under the 
First Amendment "have rarely distinguished between the rights of 
candidates and the rights of voters. "230 As the Court noted in An­
derson v. Celebrezze, "voters can assert their preferences only 
through candidates or parties."231 "[L]aws that affect candidates al­
ways have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."232 
Restrictions designed to prevent candidacies have generally been 
224. Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833-34). 
225. Id. at 524-25. 
226. 5 U.S.c. § 7323(a)(3) (2000). 
227. Id. § 7326. 
228. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 
475-76 n.21 (1995). 
229. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). 
230. Cook, 531 U.S. at 531 (Rehnquist, c.J., concurring). 
231. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983). 
232. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143. 
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found to be unconstitutional.233 The government cannot constitu­
tionally manipulate the electoral process in such a way as to defeat 
the aspirations of particular candidates or political parties.234 
Even if one's candidacy is viewed outside of the perspective of 
a party wishing to support that candidate, First Amendment rights 
are individual rights as much as they are collective rights.235 As the 
Court noted in Wooley v. Maynard, "[t]he right to speak and the 
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of 
the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' "236 Each in­
dividual has the right to seek election to a public office for which he 
or she is qualified. The availability of other candidates for parties 
and citizens to support is no justification for infringing the First 
Amendment rights of a particular person. Since the constitutional 
structure presumes that "the people should choose whom they 
please to govern them," the voters have the right to hear from all 
who wish to govern.237 Deciding who their leaders should be is the 
voters' right, not the government's prerogative. If the Supreme 
Court is serious when it says that the Free Speech Clause" 'has its 
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of cam­
paigns for political office,'" it cannot continue to adhere to an un­
principled line of decisions permitting the government to retaliate 
against its own employees precisely because they opt to "'cam­
paign[ ] for political office.' "238 
The issue is admittedly more complicated where a particular 
jurisdiction defines eligibility for a given political office with refer­
233. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992). 
234. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968). 
235. The government may enact reasonable regulations to prevent election-re­
lated disorder, and "[nlo bright line separates permissible election-related regulation 
from unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms." Timmons v. Twin 
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997). Although the Supreme Court noted in 
Timmons that a political party's associational rights are not severely burdened merely 
because a particular candidate may not appear on the ballot as that party's nominee, 
the Court made that observation in the context of a case involving an antifusion statute. 
Id. In Timmons, the Court upheld a Minnesota law that prohibited the same "candi­
date from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party." Id. at 354. 
The Court reasoned that the law did not prevent other parties from endorsing the nomi­
nee of a particular party. [d. at 360. For this reason, the law did not violate the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 363. The law prevented no one from seeking pub­
lic office, and did not suppress any party's preferences. 
236. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
237. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,547 (1969). 
238. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1969) (emphasis added) (quoting Monitor 
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)). 
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ence to one's employment status. For instance, in Clements v. Fash­
ing, the Supreme Court upheld article III, section 19, of the Texas 
Constitution, which provides: 
[No] judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General, 
clerk of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative 
office under the United States, or this State, or any foreign gov­
ernment shall during the term for which he is elected or ap­
pointed, be eligible to the Legislature.239 
The Court has observed that it has not always "attached such fun­
damental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of 
review" every time regulatory restrictions place a burden on some­
one's ability to run for public office.240 Nevertheless, there are rec­
ognized reasons for not treating the right to be a candidate for 
political office as fundamental for all purposes. For instance, most 
elective offices must be filled with an occupant who meets a mini­
mum age requirement. Such age requirements do not raise serious 
constitutional concerns, since the "States may discriminate on the 
basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the 
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest."241 A determination that the right to run for public 
office is fundamental in all contexts would require that age qualifi­
cations for various political offices be evaluated under the strict 
scrutiny standard, which applies to challenges brought under the 
Equal Protection Clause for discrimination based on suspect classi­
fications or under the Due Process Clause for actions that burden 
the exercise of fundamental rights.242 The reality that the states 
have a reasonable degree of latitude to define the qualifications for 
their own public offices does not provide a constitutional justifica­
tion for the kind of retaliatory termination mandated by 
§§ 7323(a)(3) and 7326. Where an individual meets the qualifica­
tions for a particular office, governmental action against him or her 
for choosing to run for that office violates fundamental constitu­
tional principles that are simply not implicated by more generalized 
provisions setting forth age qualifications for political officeholders. 
Even when federal employees accept public employment, they 
remain eligible to serve in Congress if they satisfy the qualifications 
enumerated in Article I. Yet, §§ 7323(a)(3) and 7326 provide for 
239. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 19; see Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 960 (1982). 
240. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972). 
241. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000). 
242. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988). 
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the same kind of dismissal that was found to be unconstitutional in 
Pickering, since candidates run for political office in their capacities 
as private citizens rather than in their capacities as government em­
ployees. While government employees have no constitutional right 
to public employment, the First Amendment prohibits the govern­
ment from terminating an employee in retaliation for engaging in 
expressive activities protected by the First Amendment. In Perry v. 
Sindermann, the Court explained: 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that 
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable government 
benefit and even though the government may deny him the bene­
fit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which 
the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a 
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected in­
terests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the 
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his con­
stitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of 
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited.243 
The Hatch Act clearly violates this fundamental principle. 
The Qualifications Clauses prevent incumbents in Congress 
from fencing potential challengers out of the political process di­
rectly. However, §§ 7323(a)(3) and 7326 ensure that federal em­
ployees who run will be dismissed. This appears to be a 
manipUlative attempt to deter a large class of individuals from run­
ning for partisan political office. Moreover, it represents hypocrisy 
of the worst kind, since members of Congress rarely resign when 
they decide to run for a different office. Given that § 7323(a) now 
permits most federal employees to participate in partisan political 
activity, the government's reliance on an "employee-protective ra­
tionale" to justify a "proscriptive rule"244 can no longer withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. It is difficult to fathom how an employee 
can feel pressured or coerced to participate in his or her own politi­
cal campaign. Moreover, since federal employees are free to run 
for nonpartisan political offices, § 7323(a)(3) cannot be justified on 
the ground that political candidacies by such employees would un­
dermine "workplace efficiency."245 Section 7323(a)(3) acts only as 
an incumbent-protection provision. 
243. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,597 (1972). 
244. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 
475-76 n.21 (1995). 
245. Id. 
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As Justice Scalia recently noted in Rein v. Freedom from Relig­
ion Foundation, Inc., the Supreme Court is charged with the duty 
"to decide cases by [the] rule of law rather than [by a] show of 
hands."246 The constitutionality of restrictions on the expressive ac­
tivities of public employees depends on whether such restraints 
"are necessary for [government] employers to operate efficiently 
and effectively."247 In United Public Workers and Letter Carriers, 
the Court never determined that the Hatch Act was necessary for 
any purpose, choosing instead to defer to Congress's judgment.248 
Such unqualified deference to Congress is particularly unwarranted 
when the very constitutional provision being construed provides 
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech."249 Section 7323(a)(3) is wholly unrelated to any interest 
aside from incumbent protectionism, and it is unconstitutional. 
IV. THE HATCH ACT'S ApPLICATION TO 
STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES 
The Hatch Act's prohibition on partisan political candidacies 
applies to certain state and local government employees as well as 
federal employees. The Act defines a 
[s]tate or local officer or employee [as] an individual employed 
by a State or local agency whose principal employment is in con­
nection with an activity which is financed in whole or in part by 
loans or grants made by the United States or a Federal agency, 
but does not include-an individual who exercises no functions 
in connection with that activity[] or an individual employed by 
an educational or research institution, establishment, agency, or 
system which is supported in whole or in part by a State or politi­
cal subdivision thereof, or by a recognized, philanthropic, or cul­
tural organization.25o 
The substantive statutory provisions of 5 U.S.c. § 1502(a) provide: 
(a) A State or local officer or employee may not­
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of 
interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomina­
tion for office; 
246. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573 (2007) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
247. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
248. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994); Rutan v. Republican Party of 
Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
249. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
250. 5 U.S.c. § 1501(4) (2000). 
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(2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to coerce, com­
mand, or advise a State or local officer or employee to pay, lend, 
or contribute anything of value to a party, committee, organiza­
tion, agency, or person for political purposes; or 
(3) be a candidate for elective office.251 
Further, 5 U.S.c. § 1502(b) and (c) state that 
(b) A State or local officer or employee retains the right to vote 
as he chooses and to express his opinions on political subjects 
and candidates. 
(c) Subsection [1S02](a)(3)['s candidacy prohibition] does not 
apply to­
(1) the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a State or an 
individual authorized by law to act as Governor; 
(2) the mayor of a city; 
(3) a duly elected head of an executive department of a State 
or municipality who is not classified under a State or municipal 
merit or civil-service system; or 
(4) an individual holding elective office.252 
Moreover, 
Section 1502(a)(3) ... does not prohibit any State or local officer 
or employee from being a candidate in any election if none of the 
candidates is to be nominated or elected at such election as rep­
resenting a party any of whose candidates for Presidential elector 
received votes in the last preceding election at which Presidential 
electors were selected.253 
The statutory enforcement mechanisms are established by 
§§ 1504 to 1507. Section 1504 directs federal agencies to report vio­
lations of § 1502 to the Special Counsel, who is supposed to "inves­
tigate the report and such other information and present his 
findings and any charges based on such findings to the Merit Sys­
tems Protection Board."254 After a hearing at which the state or 
local officer or employee is entitled to be present, the Merit Sys­
tems Protection Board is directed to 
determine whether a violation of § 1502 . . . has occurred; [to] 
determine whether the violation warrants the removal of the of­
ficer or employee from his office or employment; and [to] notify 
251. Id. § 1502(a)(I)-(3). 
252. Id. § 1502(b), (c)(I)-(4). 
253. Id. § 1503. 
254. Id. § 1504. 
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the officer or employee and the [employing state or local] agency 
of the determination by registered or certified mail.255 
The remedial provisions contained in § 1506 provide for the with­
holding of federal funds from a state or local agency which fails to 
remove an employee in accordance with a determination made by 
the Merit Systems Protection Board.256 Section 1508 provides for 
judicial review of determinations made by the Merit Systems Pro­
tection Board in a federal district court.257 
Sections 1502(a)(1) and 1502(a)(2) describe the forms of inter­
ference and coercion that can undermine the integrity of the electo­
ral process.258 Section 1502(a)(3), however, simply prohibits 
covered employees from being candidates in partisan elections.259 
The candidacy prohibition bears no rational relationship to any in­
terest in preventing interference with the electoral process or 
255. Id. § 1505(1)-(3). 
256. Id. § 1506. 
(a) When the Merit Systems Protection Board finds­
(1) that a State or local officer or employee has not been removed 
from his office or employment within 30 days after notice of a determination 
by the Board that he has violated section 1502 of this title [5 U.S.c.] and that 
the violation warrants removal; or 
(2) that the State or local officer or employee has been removed and 
has been appointed within 18 months after his removal to an office or employ­
ment in the same State in a State or local agency which does not receive loans 
or grants from a Federal agency; 
the Board shall make and certify to the appropriate Federal agency an order 
requiring that agency to withhold from its loans or grants to the State or local 
agency to which notice was given an amount equal to 2 years' pay at the rate 
the officer or employee was receiving at the time of the violation. When the 
State or local agency to which appointment within 18 months after removal 
has been made is one that receives loans or grants from a Federal agency, the 
Board order shall direct that the withholding be made from that State or local 
agency. 
(b) Notice of the order shall be sent by registered or certified mail to the 
State or local agency from which the amount is ordered to be withheld. After 
the order becomes final, the Federal agency to which the order is certified 
shall withhold the amount in accordance with the terms of the order. Except 
as provided by section 1508 of this title [5 U.S.c.], a determination or order of 
the Board becomes final at the end of 30 days after mailing the notice of the 
determination or order. 
(c) The Board may not require an amount to be withheld from a loan or 
grant pledged by a State or local agency as security for its bonds or notes if the 
withholding of that amount would jeopardize the payment of the principal or 
interest on the bonds or notes. 
Id. § 1506(a)-(c). 
257. Id. § 1508. 
258. Id. § 1502(a)(1)-(2). 
259. Id. § 1502(a)(3). 
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shielding government employees from political coercion. Since 
§ 1502(a)(3) prohibits covered employees from running for public 
office in partisan political elections, it implicates First Amendment 
concerns. 
Prior to 1974, the Hatch Act prohibited covered state and local 
employees "from assuming any active role in political cam­
paigns."26o The statute was amended in 1974 to permit state and 
local employees to participate in political campaigns, but 
§ 1502(a)(3) continued to prohibit covered employees from being 
candidates in partisan e1ections,261 "Section 1503 was amended to 
specifically allow nonpartisan candidacies," since it had previously 
permitted nonpartisan political activities in a more general sense.262 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the 
Hatch Act's application to state and local employees in Oklahoma 
v. United States Civil Service Commission, holding that the Act's 
application to Oklahoma's employees did not violate the Tenth 
Amendment.263 The Court stated that "[w]hile the United States is 
not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political 
activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the 
terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be dis­
bursed."264 This case was decided on the same day as United Public 
Workers.265 Noting its consideration in United Public Workers of 
whether the Hatch Act violated the First Amendment, the Court 
stated that the facts in Oklahoma did not "require any further dis­
cussion of that angle."266 
Oklahoma was brought by the state rather than by the state's 
employees. Consequently, the First Amendment implications of 
the Hatch Act's application to state and local employees were not 
squarely at issue. It is unclear whether the Court's reference to its 
holding in United Public Workers was meant to foreclose First 
Amendment claims against the Hatch Act's application to state and 
local employees. In any event, a federal statute prohibiting state 
and local government employees from engaging in partisan political 
activity implicates constitutional concerns beyond those discussed 
in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers. 
260. Bauers v. Cornett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1523 (8th Cir. 1989). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-45 (1947). 
264. /d. at 143. 
265. /d. at 127; United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 75 (1947). 
266. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 142. 
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The Supreme Court's post hoc explanations for its decisions in 
United Public Workers and Letter Carriers have generally centered 
on the principle that "[t]he government's interest in achieving its 
goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a rel­
atively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant 
one when it acts as employer."267 Nevertheless, this principle can­
not be relied upon to save prohibitions like § 1502(a)(3) from con­
stitutional infirmity. Congress has no general constitutional 
authority to regulate the conduct of state and local government em­
ployees.268 When the federal government imposes restrictions on 
the political activities of state and local government employees, it 
acts as a sovereign rather than as an employer.269 Even if it is as­
sumed that a state can restrict the political activities of its own em­
ployees without violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments, it 
does not follow that Congress can impose similar restrictions on the 
state's employees without violating the First Amendment. 
Moreover, it is worth noting that Congress cannot use its 
Spending Clause authority to entice the states to violate the Four­
teenth Amendment.270 Congress "may not 'induce' [a] recipient [of 
federal funds] 'to engage in activities that would themselves be un­
constitutional.' "271 The First Amendment's prohibitions, of course, 
are incorporated within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and are applicable against the states.272 For this rea­
son, a determination that a state could not constitutionally impose a 
restriction such as § 1502(a)(3) on its own employees would obvi­
ously render Congress's attempt to do so unconstitutional. Section 
1502(a)(3), however, violates the First Amendment even if the 
states could directly impose identical restrictions on their own 
employees. 
267. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,675 (1994). 
268. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-35 (1997). In Printz, the Court 
held that "[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States 
to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their polit­
ical subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." /d. at 935. 
269. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 691-92 
(N.D. Ohio 2007). 
270. As the Supreme Court explained in Saenz v. Roe, "Congress has no affirma­
tive power to authorize the states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and is implic­
itly prohibited from passing legislation that purports to validate any such violation." 
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999). See generally U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. 
271. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194,203 (2003) (quoting South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987». 
272. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 508 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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In Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court declared that "when the 
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is 
entitled to define the limits of that program."273 When Congress 
exercises its authority under the Spending Clause, it can insist "that 
public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were author­
ized."274 Nevertheless, conditions placed by Congress on those who 
receive federal funds are not categorically immune from First 
Amendment scrutiny. The Court noted in Legal Services Corp. v. 
Velazquez that "[w]here private speech is involved, even Congress' 
antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of 
ideas thought inimical to the Government's own interest."275 Since 
the federal government does not employ the state and local govern­
ment employees covered by § 1502(a)(3), the statutory prohibition 
must be analyzed as an exercise of Congress's Spending Clause 
authority.276 
The Court's statement in Rust that Congress may demand that 
public funds be used only as authorized is inapplicable to the Hatch 
Act.277 The partisan candidacy prohibition imposed by § 1502(a)(3) 
bears no rational relationship to programs funded by Congress. 
The prohibition is not imposed on the recipients of federal funds. 
Instead, it is imposed on the employees of recipients. While the 
enforcement mechanism established by § 1506 provides for the 
withholding of federal funds if a state or local agency refuses to 
dismiss an employee who has violated § 1502, the substantive 
prohibitions are imposed on the employees in their private capaci­
ties.278 There is no nexus whatsoever between the prohibitions con­
tained in § 1502(a)(3) and the federally funded activities. Section 
1501(4) simply defines a state employee as "an individual employed 
by a State or local agency whose principal employment is in connec­
tion with an activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans 
or grants made by the United States or a Federal agency," and 
§ 1502(a)(3) prohibits such employees from being candidates in 
partisan elections.279 The prohibition itself is not defined with re­
spect to any funded program or activity. 
273. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). 
274. Id. at 196. 
275. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001). 
276. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 691-92 
(N.D. Ohio 2007). 
277. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196. 
278. 5 U.S.c. §§ 1502(a)(1)-(3), 1506 (2000). 
279. Id. §§ 1501(4), 1502(a)(3). 
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Congress often includes within a particular legislative scheme a 
jurisdictional element, which operates to limit the prohibition's ap­
plication to a discrete category of conduct falling within Congress's 
legislative jurisdiction.280 Section 1501(4) incorporates state or lo­
cal agencies' receipt of federal funds as a jurisdictional element to 
provide a basis for federal legislative jurisdiction.281 In this respect, 
Congress's use of its Spending Clause authority to impose 
§ 1502(a)(3)'s candidacy prohibition on covered state and local gov­
ernment employees is indistinguishable from its use of its Com­
merce Clause authority in other contexts.282 In some instances, 
Congress uses its powers under both the Spending Clause and the 
Commerce Clause to enact substantive statutory provisions. 
An example of this use of jurisdictional elements can be found 
in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which 
is codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000CC.283 Section 2000cc includes 
prohibitions on certain land use regulations, and § 2000cc-1 imposes 
limits on the ability of government entities to impose incidental 
burdens on the religious freedom of institutionalized persons.284 
Section 2000cc-1(b)(1) uses the covered governmental entities' re­
ceipt of federal funds as a means to establish federal legislative ju­
risdiction, while § 2000cc-1(b)(2) uses Congress's powers under the 
Foreign, Interstate, and Indian Commerce Clauses for the same 
purpose,285 Without such jurisdictional elements, Congress would 
280. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000). 
281. 5 U.S.c. § 1501(4). 
282. 42 U.S.c. § 2000cc-1(b)(1)-(2) (2000). 
283. Id. § 2000cc-5. 
284. Id. §§ 2000cc to cc-1. Section 2000cc-1 provides: 
(a) General rule. 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a 
person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in [section 2 of the 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 42 U.S.c. § 1997], even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government 
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person­
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern­
mental interest. 
(b) Scope of application. 

This section applies in any case in which­
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that re­
ceives Federal financial assistance; or 
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden 
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with 
Indian tribes. 
Id. § 2000cc-1. 
285. Id. § 2000cc-1(b)(1)-(2). 
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have no constitutional authority to enact the substantive prohibi­
tions contained within § 2000cc-1(a).286 This same principle applies 
to the jurisdictional element incorporated within § 1502(a)(3) by 
the definition contained in § 1501(4). 
The mere existence of a jurisdictional element premised on the 
Spending Clause, however, does not insulate a statute from First 
Amendment scrutiny. Instead, it simply provides a jurisdictional 
basis for federal legislation. The First Amendment imposes sub­
stantive limits on Congress's Spending Clause authority.287 Since 
§ 1502(a)(3) limits the private activities of funding recipients' em­
ployees rather than the activities of the funding recipients them­
selves, any perceived link between the federal funds and the 
prohibited activities is very attenuated. Because § 1502(a)(3)'s par­
tisan candidacy proscription, at a minimum, implicates the First 
Amendment rights of covered employees, it cannot be sustained on 
such an attenuated basis. 
If Congress could constitutionally impose § 1502(a)(3) on cov­
ered state and local government employees merely because their 
employers are recipients of federal funds, there is no logical reason 
why Congress could not also impose a similar prohibition on state 
and local government employees whose employers have some effect 
on interstate commerce. If a jurisdictional element is enough to jus­
tify the proscription, it is difficult to imagine why the particular con­
stitutional power invoked by Congress would make a dispositive 
difference. Moreover, if the employees of state and local agencies 
could be prohibited from running for partisan political office simply 
because their employers receive federal money, there is no reason 
why Congress could not also impose a similar restriction on the em­
ployees of private entities that receive federal money. For instance, 
Congress could apply § 1502(a)(3)'s prohibition to the employees 
of private colleges and universities that receive federal funds. Since 
§ 1502(a)(3) is not linked to an employment relationship between 
the federal government and covered state and local government 
employees, the federal government is acting as a sovereign rather 
than as an employer.288 If the First Amendment permitted the fed­
eral government to use its sovereign powers to prohibit partisan po­
litical candidacies, there would be no logical basis for distinguishing 
286. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 715 (2005). 
287. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1968). 
288. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 691-92 
(N.D. Ohio 2007). 
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between the employees of state and local governments that receive 
federal funds and the employees of private entities that also receive 
such funds. The logical conclusion, of course, is that Congress can­
not use its sovereign powers to prohibit partisan political candida­
cies, and that § 1502(a)(3) is unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has not clearly explained when a funding 
condition imposed on a private entity ceases to be permissible and 
becomes unconstitutional. In Grove City College v. Bell, the Court 
declared that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambigu­
ous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational insti­
tutions are not obligated to accept. "289 Voluntariness alone, 
however, does not insulate a funding condition from constitutional 
scrutiny. As the Court explained in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca­
demic and Institutional Rights, Inc., while it is unclear where the 
line between "reasonable" conditions and unconstitutional condi­
tions lies, "[i]t is clear that a funding condition cannot be unconsti­
tutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly."290 It is safe 
to say that the federal government, acting in its sovereign capacity, 
could not constitutionally prohibit classes of individuals from run­
ning for partisan political office. 
If § 1502's prohibitions applied directly to state and local agen­
cies, they would arguably be immune from First Amendment scru­
tiny on the ground that governmental entities do not have First 
Amendment rights.291 Nevertheless, employees of governmental 
entities do have First Amendment rights. Since § 1502(a)(3) im­
poses a partisan candidacy prohibition on covered state and local 
government employees in their private capacities, the First Amend­
ment is clearly implicated. Moreover, since covered employees 
have no control over whether their employers receive federal funds, 
they are not in a position to reject such funds in order to protect 
their constitutional rights. Spending Clause legislation "is much in 
the nature of a contract," and conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds must be accepted "voluntarily and knowingly."292 Such legis­
lation must be construed from the perspective of a recipient en­
gaged in the process of deciding whether to accept federal funds 
289. Grove City Coli. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,575 (1984). 
290. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59-60 
(2006). 
291. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194,210-11 (2003). 
292. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 2 (1981). 
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and "the obligations that go with those funds."293 It is difficult to 
fathom how this rule of construction should be applied when the 
obligations attached to federal funds are imposed on the employees 
of recipients rather than on the recipients themselves. 
Given the reality that a Spending Clause nexus such as that 
contained in §§ 1501(4) and 1502(a)(3) could not justify the imposi­
tion of a partisan candidacy proscription on the employees of pri­
vate institutions, it is axiomatic that § 1502(a)(3) violates the First 
Amendment. In Molina-Crespo v. United States Merit Systems Pro­
tection Board, however, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio found an innovative way to uphold it.294 The inter­
ests identified by the district court as a justification for upholding 
§ 1502(a)(3) included the federal government's interests in ensuring 
both "that state programs funded . . . with federal dollars [were] 
administered in a non-partisan manner" and that members of the 
public were not left with the impression "that those involved in ad­
ministering [funded] programs" were "partisan politicians exerting 
inappropriate partisan influence."295 Based on these interests, the 
district court determined that § 1502(a)(3) passed the rational basis 
test.296 
In an alternative analysis, the district court explained why it 
believed that § 1502(a)(3) also satisfied the demands of strict 
scrutiny: 
[T]he Court finds that under strict scrutiny review, the prohibi­
tion against running for partisan elected office is narrowly tai­
lored to the perceived harm. Covered state and local employees 
remain free to engage in a wide range of political activities. In­
deed, when Congress amended the Act in 1974 to loosen the con­
straints on political activity for state or local employees, only 
three narrowly focused restraints remained, one of which is the 
§ 1S02(a)(3) ban on being a candidate for elective office. There­
fore, the restriction in § 1S02(a)(3), of which Molina-Crespo had 
full knowledge before he chose to run for elective office, is nar­
rowly tailored, and thus does not unduly burden the First 
Amendment rights of state and local employees.297 
293. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459 
(2006). 
294. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680 (N.D. Ohio 
2007). 
295. Id. at 691. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 693 (citations omitted). 
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Given the meaningless review provided by the Supreme Court in 
United Public Workers, Letter Carriers, and Oklahoma, it is very 
easy to see why the district court had no idea as to what standard 
was applicable in Molina-Crespo. Nevertheless, the district court's 
analysis clearly failed to comport with fundamental principles of 
constitutional law. The applicable test for evaluating the constitu­
tionality of § 1502(a)(3) under the First Amendment cannot be ra­
tional basis, which is far more deferential than the balancing test 
established in Pickering. Since the federal government acts as a 
sovereign rather than as an employer with respect to 
§ 1502(a)(3),298 there is no basis whatsoever for applying a standard 
that is less rigorous than the Pickering balancing test. 
When the district court applied the strict scrutiny analysis, it 
applied it incorrectly. Where strict scrutiny is the test, the govern­
ment must show that the challenged enactment is narrowly tailored 
to secure a compelling governmental interest.299 It is not sufficient 
for the government to show that the challenged enactment is nar­
rowly tailored to address a perceived harm. Far from a principled 
application of the Constitution, the district court's decision in 
Molina-Crespo is only the latest in the federal judiciary's long line 
of pro-Hatch Act novelties. 
It is clear that the prohibitions contained in §§ 1502(a)(1) and 
1502(a)(2) are constitutionally permissible. No one has a First 
Amendment right to interfere with or affect the result of an elec­
tion by using official authority, or to coerce someone else to make a 
political contribution.30o The federal government may use its sover­
eign authority under the Spending Clause to prohibit covered state 
and local government employees from engaging in such corrupt ac­
tivities. Section 1502(a)(3), however, raises wholly different consti­
tutional concerns. If the First Amendment provides even minimal 
protection to an individual's right to run for a partisan political of­
fice, § 1502(a)(3) cannot stand. The prohibition is wholly unrelated 
to the federal funds involved, since it restricts the employees of re­
cipients rather than the recipients themselves.301 There is no nexus 
between the partisan candidacy proscription and any funded pro­
gram, since the proscription is not defined with respect to any par­
ticular program or activity.302 The object of the legislation is the 
298. !d. at 691-92. 
299. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002). 
300. 5 U.S.c. § 1502(a)(1)-(2) (2000). 
301. Jd. §§ 1501(4), 1502(a)(3). 
302. Jd. 
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abridgment of speech, not the allocation of federal money. Section 
1502(a)(3) is not an attempt to control federal spending. Instead, 
Congress invoked federal spending as a jurisdictional basis for en­
acting § 1502(a)(3). Federal funding is identified in § 1501(4) solely 
to enable incumbents in Congress to prohibit a broad class of indi­
viduals from doing what those same incumbents did to secure their 
positions.303 
In Molina-Crespo, the district court was right about one thing: 
Section 1502(a)(3) is narrowly tailored.304 It is tailored so narrowly 
that it prohibits only the very thing that can unseat an incumbent in 
Congress. Under § 1503, covered employees can run for political 
office in nonpartisan elections.305 In their private capacities, they 
remain free to engage in a wide variety of political activities. As 
long as they refrain from running for partisan political office, they 
will not be harassed by the Merit Systems Protection Board. How­
ever, if they dare to challenge a partisan incumbent, retaliatory ac­
tions of the kind condemned in Elrod, Branti, Rutan, Umbehr, and 
O'Hare will be undertaken by the federal government in the name 
of the law.306 Section 1502(a)(3) is the quintessential example of a 
constitutionally suspect statutory provision. It is both too narrow 
and too broad.307 It narrowly prohibits only the very thing that 
threatens the ambitions of its drafters, and it broadly casts its net 
around all state and local government employees within § 1501(4)'s 
jurisdictional element.308 It leaves political speech untouched only 
if it has no meaningful purpose, and it muzzles speech with electoral 
significance. If § 1502(a)(3) can withstand constitutional scrutiny, 
the First Amendment is an empty promise. 
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
The provisions of the Hatch Act governing both federal and 
state employees make it clear that covered employees retain their 
right to vote.309 Many employees covered by the provisions of the 
Hatch Act, particularly those covered by § 7323(b), may consider 
their right to vote to be more important than any right to partici­
303. Id. § 1501(4). 
304. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 693 (N.D. 
Ohio 2007). 
305. 5 U.S.c. § 1503. 
306. Id. §§ 1504-1506. 
307. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
308. 5 U.S.c. § 1501(4). 
309. Id. §§ 1502(b), 7323(c). 
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pate in partisan political activity. While the electoral franchise is 
certainly important, the right to engage in political activity is, in 
many respects, even more fundamental than the right to cast a vote. 
When the Constitution was first adopted, only members of the 
House of Representatives were chosen by popular vote.310 U.S. 
senators were chosen by their respective state legislatures.311 Sena­
tors were not elected by popular vote until the enactment of the 
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.312 Consequently, when the First 
Amendment was adopted in 1791, the idea of holding popular elec­
tions for U.S. senators was wholly foreign to the Constitution. Nev­
ertheless, the people had the right to engage in expressive activities 
for the purpose of influencing their state legislators, who were re­
sponsible for choosing U.S. senators. 
Americans are accustomed to voting in presidential elections, 
but popular elections for presidential electors are certainly not re­
quired by the Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1, it is the 
responsibility of each state to "appoint, in such Manner as the Leg­
islature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the 
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State 
may be entitled in the Congress."313 Pursuant to the Twenty-third 
Amendment, the District of Columbia is entitled to appoint, 
in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors 
of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of 
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District 
would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the 
least populous State.314 
The electors appointed by the states and the District of Columbia 
elect the President and the Vice President in accordance with the 
procedures established by the Twelfth Amendment.315 
Although Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment316 and Sec­
tion 1 of the Twenty-fourth Amendment317 acknowledge the exis­
tence of popular elections for the purpose of appointing 
presidential electors, these provisions do not require any state, or 
the District of Columbia, to hold popular elections for that pur­
310. u.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. l. 
311. Id. art. I, § 3. 
312. Id. amend. XVII. 
313. Id. art. II, § 1. 
314. Id. amend. XXIII. 
315. Id. amend. XII. 
316. Id. amend. XIV, § 2. 
317. Id. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
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pose.318 As the Supreme Court explained in Bush v. Gore, "The 
individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for elec­
tors for the President of the United States unless and until the state 
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement 
its power to appoint members of the electoral college. "319 A state 
"may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed was 
the manner used by state legislatures in several states for many 
years after the framing of our Constitution."32o Having granted the 
franchise to the people, a state remains free to "take back the 
power to appoint electors" pursuant to Article II, Section 1.321 Ac­
cordingly, Americans cast their votes in presidential elections not as 
a matter of constitutional right, but as a matter of legislative grace. 
The right to cast such a vote is wholly dependent on the continuing 
assent of the respective state legislature. 
The freedom to speak for or against a particular presidential 
candidate, however, is not dependent on the consent of any govern­
mental entity. Congress may, if it so chooses, use its authority 
under the Twenty-third Amendment to deprive the residents of the 
District of Columbia of their statutory right to vote for presidential 
electors. Nonetheless, Congress may not deprive those residents, or 
the residents of the several states, of their freedom of speech. 
The Free Speech Clause, of course, is incorporated within the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.322 Conse­
quently, the states "shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 
speech."323 While the states remain free, under Article II, Section 
1, to deprive their citizens of their statutory right to vote for presi­
dential electors, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit 
them from banning expressive activities designed to influence presi­
dential elections. A plain reading of the Constitution reveals that, 
even more than the electoral franchise itself, "unabridged speech is 
the foundation of political freedom."324 As Justice Black noted in 
his United Public Workers dissent, "The right to vote and privately 
to express an opinion on political matters, important though they 
318. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per 
_ curiam) (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)). 
319. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam). 
320. [d. 
321. [d. 
322. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 508 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
323. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
324. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,794 (2002) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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be, are but parts of the broad freedoms which our Constitution has 
provided as the bulwark of our free political institutions. "325 
Notwithstanding the Framers' initial idea that state legislatures 
should choose their respective U.S. senators, the Seventeenth 
Amendment has now given that right to the people directly.326 De­
spite the constitutional prerogative of the states to dispense with 
popular elections for presidential electors, "[h]istory has now fa­
vored the voter, and in each of the several States the citizens them­
selves vote for Presidential electors."327 As popular elections have 
become a central feature of the American political system, the im­
portance of political campaigns has steadily increased over time. 
With popular elections for members of the Senate and the Electoral 
College, as well as for members of the House of Representatives, it 
is more important than ever that "the voice of none should be 
suppressed."328 
In order to understand the importance of the constitutional 
values undermined by the Hatch Act, one need look no further 
than the Hatch Act itself. Section 7325 provides: 
The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe regulations 
permitting employees, without regard to the prohibitions in 
paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 7323(a) and paragraph (2) of 
section 7323(b) of this title [5 U.S.c.], to take an active part in 
political management and political campaigns involving the mu­
nicipality or other political subdivision in which they reside, to 
the extent the Office considers it to be in their domestic interest, 
when­
(1) the municipality or political subdivision is in Maryland 
or Virginia and in the immediate vicinity of the District of Co­
lumbia, or is a municipality in which the majority of voters are 
employed by the Government of the United States; and 
(2) the Office determines that because of special or unusual 
circumstances which exist in the municipality or political subdivi­
sion it is in the domestic interest of the employees and individu­
als to permit that political participation.329 
This statutory language acknowledges that a democratic society 
cannot function without the political participation of its inhabitants. 
325. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 110 (1947) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
326. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
327. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam). 
328. United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting). 
329. 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (2000). 
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In this respect, the Hatch Act impugns itself. If insufficient num­
bers of people participate in the political process, democracies de­
cay, republics collapse, and free societies falter. 
Even in jurisdictions in which participants are legion, the politi­
cal process suffers when the voices of a few are silenced. In the 
words of Justice Black, "Our political system, different from many 
others, rests on the foundation of a belief in rule by the people­
not some, but all the people."330 The protections of the First 
Amendment do not contain exceptions providing for the muzzling 
of those employees covered by § 7323(b). Congress's attempt to 
silence these devoted citizens is constitutionally impermissible. 
Federal, state, and local government employees who answer 
the call to public service deserve better than to be badgered by the 
Merit Systems Protection Board. Sections lS02(a)(3) and 
7323(a)(3), which serve no interests aside from incumbent protec­
tionism, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny if the First 
Amendment is to have its intended effect. The federal judiciary's 
complicity in Congress's attempts to deter potential candidates 
from taking on partisan incumbents is antithetical to the principle 
of the principle that the government "cannot condition public em­
ployment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally 
protected interest in freedom of expression. "331 The application of 
constitutional principles compels the conclusion that the provisions 
of the Hatch Act restricting the private political activities of govern­
ment employees cannot stand. 
CONCLUSION 
For too long, the provisions of the Hatch Act restricting the 
private political activities of government employees have had un­
qualified acceptance. The reality of the matter, however, is that 
these provisions patently violate the First Amendment rights of 
covered employees without serving any clear governmental interest. 
Partisan political candidates and campaign volunteers do not per­
form governmental functions when they participate in the electoral 
process. They are merely citizens seeking to choose leaders from 
among themselves. To say that one's employment status is incom­
patible with partisan political participation is to say that his or her 
employment status is incompatible with being American. 
330. United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting). 
331. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983). 
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Congress's decision in 1993 to permit most federal executive 
employees to participate in partisan political activity is perhaps the 
strongest indicator to date that the more stringent prohibitions of 
the Hatch Act were never really necessary to prevent political ex­
tortion or coercion. Since the federal employees covered by 
§ 7323(b) remain under such prohibitions, however, it is worth not­
ing that political extortion is not only proscribed by §§ 7323(a)(1), 
7323(a)(2), and 7323(a)(4), but by several criminal statutes as welL 
It is a federal crime 
for any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or 
attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any em­
ployee of the Federal Government ... to engage in, or not to 
engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, vot­
ing or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any elec­
tion, making or refusing to make any political contribution, or 
working or refusing to work on behalf of any candidate.332 
It is also a crime for covered employees to use their official author­
ity for the purpose of interfering with an election.333 Prohibiting 
government employees from voluntarily participating in partisan 
political activity for the purpose of preventing coercion is akin to 
banning sexual intercourse for the purpose of preventing rape. The 
First Amendment rights of government employees cannot be pro­
tected by a prohibition which prevents them from exercising those 
rights in the first place. The Hatch Act's "employee-protective ra­
tionale" literally "turns the First Amendment upside down."334 
Freedom of thought cannot be secured by the suppression of 
speech. As the Supreme Court explained in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, "[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and 
speech must be protected from the government because speech is 
the beginning of thought. "335 
The government's interest in maintaining a merit-based em­
ployment system can be adequately secured without the need to 
infringe upon the First Amendment rights of government employ­
ees. Candidates are prohibited from procuring support for their 
candidacies by promising to use their influence to secure the ap­
pointment of their political allies.336 It is also illegal to promise a 
332. 18 u.s.c. § 610 (2000). 
333. [d. § 595. 
334. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002). 
335. [d. at 253. 
336. 18 U.S.c. § 599. 
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benefit to another in exchange for political favors or electoral sup­
port.337 Criminal activity is properly addressed by measures that 
punish offenders, not by measures that silence potential victims. 
It is, of course, true that political affiliation may be used by the 
government as a basis for making personnel decisions in certain in­
stances. As the Supreme Court recognized in Branti, party affilia­
tion is sometimes "an appropriate requirement for the effective 
performance of the public office involved."338 Such circumstances, 
however, are not foreign to federal employment law, and the legal 
framework for adjudicating such cases is firmly established. Al­
though Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits 
covered employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, an employer may nevertheless 
make personnel decisions on the basis of religion, sex, or national 
origin "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national 
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary 
to the normal operation of that particular business or enter­
prise."339 A similar provision is contained in the Age Discrimina­
tion in Employment AcP40 Where the particular position at issue 
is such that political affiliation is a bona fide occupational qualifica­
tion, hiring and firing decisions can constitutionally be made on the 
basis of political affiliation. This reality does not necessitate the 
suppression of the political speech of large classes of government 
employees, many of whom perform ministerial functions which do 
not implicate partisan concerns. 
The Hatch Act's prohibitions on partisan political candidacies 
are likewise unsupported by any palpable governmental interesp41 
The Constitution certainly recognizes that federal employment may 
be incompatible with concurrent service in Congress. The relevant 
portion of Article I, Section 6, provides: 
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for 
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the 
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or 
the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such 
time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, 
337. Id. § 600. 
338. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). 
339. 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). 
340. 29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
341. See generally 5 U.s.c. §§ 1502(a)(3), 7323(a)(3) (2000). 
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shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in 
Office.342 
The constitutional prohibition on concurrent congressional service 
and federal employment, however, has nothing to do with concur­
rent congressional candidacy and federal employment. Since politi­
cal candidates run for office in their private capacities, there is no 
possibility of an employment-related conflict of interest until one 
actually holds a political office. Moreover, since it is the voters who 
ultimately determine the results of elections, no government em­
ployee could assume such an office without the consent of "We the 
People." Sections 1502(a)(3) and 7323(a)(3) do not protect our de­
mocracy. Instead, they subvert it. 
While the Hatch Act is perhaps the most notable employment­
based prohibition on partisan political activity, it is by no means the 
only one. The Supreme Court decided Broadrick v. Oklahoma343 
on the same day that it decided Letter Carriers. In Broadrick, the 
Court rejected the argument that an Oklahoma statute prohibiting 
certain state employees from engaging in partisan political activity 
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.344 The Oklahoma 
statute was similar to the Hatch Act in many respects,345 but it pur­
ported to impose criminal sanctions on those who violated its provi­
sions in addition to termination from government employment.346 
Since the employees in Broadrick did not question "Oklahoma's 
right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan political con­
duct of state employees," the validity of criminal sanctions for those 
who violated the statutory prohibition on political activity was 
never before the Court.347 Nevertheless, even if one is inclined to 
accept the erroneous assumption that a governmental entity may 
constitutionally condition public employment on an employee's 
willingness to refrain from political activity, it does not follow that 
the government may impose criminal sanctions on an employee 
who engages in political activity. When the government merely ter­
minates an employee, it acts as an employer. When the government 
prosecutes an employee for engaging in political activity, it acts in 
its sovereign capacity. The First and Fourteenth Amendments 
clearly prohibit Congress and the states from using their sovereign 
342. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
343. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
344. Id. at 607-08. 
345. Id. at 604. 
346. Id. at 606. 
347. Id. 
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authority to criminalize partisan political activity, and any attempt 
to impose punishment on an employee beyond mere termination is 
blatantly unconstitutional,348 It is true that the Supreme Court 
stated in Ex parte Curtis that "[i]f it is constitutional to prohibit the 
act, the kind or degree of punishment to be inflicted for disregard­
ing the prohibition is clearly within the discretion of Congress, pro­
vided it be not cruel or unusual."349 The statute at issue in that 
case, however, did not prohibit covered employees from engaging 
in political activity. Instead, it only prohibited federal executive 
employees "from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other 
officer or employ[ ee] of the government, any money or property or 
other thing of value for political purposes."350 There is no constitu­
tional basis for imposing criminal sanctions, or any other form of 
punishment beyond mere termination, on a government employee 
who engages in political activity. Attempts to criminalize political 
activity on the part of government employees are impermissible. 
Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in Broadrick, decry­
ing the majority's willingness to allow the government to deprive its 
employees of their right to participate in partisan political activ­
ity.351 He declared that "once we fence off a group, and bar them 
from public dialogue, the public interest is the loser. "352 He went 
on to state: 
A bureaucracy that is alert, vigilant, and alive is more effi­
cient than one that is quiet and submissive. It is the First 
Amendment that makes it alert, vigilant, and alive. It is suppres­
sion of First Amendment rights that creates faceless, nameless 
bureaucrats who are inert in their localities and submissive to 
some master's voice. High values ride on today's decision in this 
case and in Letter Carriers. I would not allow the bureaucracy in 
the State or Federal Government to be deprived of First Amend­
ment rights. Their exercise certainly is as important in the public 
sector as it is in the private sector. Those who work for govern­
ment have no watered-down constitutional rights. So far as the 
348. In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court explained that "an employee's false 
criticism of his employer on grounds not of public concern may be cause for his dis­
charge but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action accorded an identi­
cal statement made by a man on the street." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 
(1983). 
349. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 374 (1882). 
350. Id. at 371. 
351. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
352. Id. at 620. 
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First Amendment goes, I would keep them on the same plane as 
all other people.353 
Justice Douglas was right in 1973, and he is right today. 
In United Public Workers, the Supreme Court acknowledged 
that Congress could not constitutionally prohibit federal employees 
from attending Mass or taking an active part in missionary work.354 
Given this limitation on Congress's authority, it is difficult to 
fathom how the Court determined that the Hatch Act was constitu­
tional, since political speech is "as deeply embedded in the First 
Amendment as proselytizing a religious cause. "355 The idea that 
government employees should expect unique burdens on their po­
litical freedom is patently absurd. Since the First Amendment im­
poses no limits on the actions of purely private entities, government 
employers are the only employers that cannot constitutionally ter­
minate their employees in retaliation for political speech. As Jus­
tice Stevens noted in his Waters dissent, "[a]bsent some contractual 
or statutory provision limiting its prerogatives, a private-sector em­
ployer may discipline or fire employees for speaking their 
minds."356 Government employees, however, have a First Amend­
ment right to speak their minds, and to be free from retaliatory 
termination for doing SO.357 
The fact that so many government employees blindly acquiesce 
to unconstitutional restrictions on their political activities is the 
strongest evidence to date that the government has succeeded in 
creating "faceless, nameless bureaucrats who are inert in their local­
ities and submissive to some master's voice. "358 It is incumbent 
upon all government employees to wake up, to speak out, and to 
demand an end to this subtle form of tyranny. Prohibitions on po­
litical activity are the hallmarks of tyrannical regimes and wicked 
rulers. They need not be the hallmarks of government employers in 
the United States. In recent years, the world has witnessed the 
courage of the brave citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan, who partici­
pated in historic elections despite the fact that terrorists were trying 
to kill them in retaliation for doing so. They understood that their 
young democracies would falter without their participation. Sec­
353. Id. at 62l. 
354. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947). 
355. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 598 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
356. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
357. Id. at 695. 
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tions 1502(a)(3), 7323(a)(3), and 7323(b) of the Hatch Act cannot 
stand if American democracy is to continue to flourish. Our de­
mocracy is fragile, and our Constitution is not a self-executing 
formula. As Americans, we cannot afford to let any institution 
erode the bulwarks of freedom enshrined in our Constitution-not 
even our own government. 
